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INTRODUCTION
The November 2004 presidential election and calls for reform in
its aftermath illustrate the wisdom of the United States Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement on campaign finance regulation.
In upholding most of the major provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), 1 the Court remarked
perceptively, "[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet. What
problems will arise, and how Congress will respond are concerns for
1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 28, and 47 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. 2002)).
BCRA is also referred to by journalists as the "McCain-Feingold" campaign finance
reform bill. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Justices Uphold Campaign Finance Law: Court
Endorses 'Soft Money' Ban, Rejecting Free-Speech Concerns, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2003,
at Al (using McCain-Feingold terminology).
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another day."2 Although BCRA eliminated the flow of unregulated
"soft money" into national, state, and local political party coffers,3 the
new law increased "hard money" contribution limits to candidates
and political parties.4 Moreover, BCRA did nothing to prevent the
flow of unregulated money to politically-oriented groups outside the
political party system.5  As a result of the changed regulatory
landscape and intense interest in the presidential election, the 2004
elections-the first operated after the passage of BCRA-were the
most expensive in United States history.6 In the wake of the 2004
election cycle, members of Congress and campaign reform
organizations called for a new wave of legislation aimed at altering
the structure of campaign finance laws.7 To scholars who have
watched the campaign finance reform debate over the course of many
2. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93,224 (2003).
3. BCRA § 101(a), 2 U.S.C. § 441i. The term "soft money" refers to contributions
made to national political party organizations in amounts and from sources prohibited by
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-23; see infra text accompanying notes 86-87. FECA was the
precursor to BCRA. See infra Part I.A.
4. BCRA § 307, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a). The term "hard money" refers to contributions
to political candidates, national political party organizations, and political action
committees ("PACs") that are limited in amount by FECA and subject to public
disclosure. See infra note 51 (summarizing original and current hard money contribution
limits on individual contributions to candidates, political parties, and PACs).
5. Whether the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") should regulate independent
political groups ("527s") has been a subject of controversy. The FEC initiated a
rulemaking proceeding in 2001 to determine whether 527 political committees registering
with the IRS were subject to FECA. See Definition of Political Committee, 66 Fed. Reg.
13,681, 13,687 (Mar. 7, 2001) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2005)). However, the
Commission suspended its rulemaking later that year "pending, among other things,
possible legislative or court action and the completion of other rulemaking projects." See
Phillip Dean, Definition of 'Political Committee' Rulemaking Held in Abeyance, 27 FED.
ELECTION COMM'N REC. 1, 3 (2001), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/record/2001/
nov01.pdf. The Commission again considered the issue in 2004, but ultimately decided not
to promulgate a rule applicable to all federally-oriented 527 political organizations. See
Political Committee Status, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,056, 68,064-65 (Nov. 23, 2004) (reporting that
the FEC declined to adopt a rule for the 2004 elections defining 527 organizations as
"political committees" within the meaning of FECA but adopting a rule to take effect for
the 2006 cycle which will apply only to 527s that solicit funds explicitly for aiding in the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate).
6. Open Secrets, 2004 Presidential Election, http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/
index.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2005). Total spending by political parties, the candidates'
campaigns, and outside groups exceeded $1.7 billion over the 20034A election cycle.
Thomas B. Edsall & Derek Willis, Fundraising Records Broken by Both Major Political
Parties, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2004, at A7. Unless otherwise noted, all dollar amounts
referenced in this Comment are actual amounts reported, unadjusted for inflation.
7. See infra notes 20-23 (summarizing congressional reform efforts); Part III.C.3
(same).
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years, this most recent course of events and the pressure for
additional reform should have come as no surprise.
8
Much of the media attention during and after the 2004 election
cycle focused on the influx of cash to independent political
organizations,9 often called "527s" for the section of the Internal
Revenue Code under which they are organized. 10 Although active in
previous election cycles," 527s took on new significance in the 2004
8. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hyrdraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1715 (1999) (forecasting that each effort at reform
will inevitably lead to unintended consequences that, in turn, will touch off a new wave of
reform). Professors Issacharoff and Karlan even predicted fairly accurately the
progression of reform when they wrote, "any reform agenda focusing on fundraising and
expenditures by the candidates and political parties will have the predictable effect of
channeling the influence of money away from the regulated entities and into its own
domain." Id. at 1717. Indeed, in 2004, BCRA's limitations on political parties' raising and
spending of soft money led to the funneling of resources to independent groups. See infra
Part II.
9. See, e.g., James V. Grimaldi & Thomas B. Edsall, Super Rich Step into Political
Vacuum, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at Al (asserting that, "[b]y banning the use of large
'soft money' contributions to party organizations, the McCain-Feingold campaign finance
law essentially made 527s the only conduit for unregulated and unlimited contributions");
Richard Rainey, Financing His Own Anti-Bush Campaign, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004, at
A21 (discussing billionaire George Soros's individual efforts to defeat President George
W. Bush, as well as Soros's multi-million dollar contributions to the 527 organizations
MoveOn.org and America Coming Together to aid efforts to defeat Bush).
10. I.R.C. § 527 (2000) (requiring disclosure and reporting by "a party, committee,
association, fund, or other organization ... organized and operated primarily for the
function of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures ... for
the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election,
or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office .... ). All
political organizations and committees are classified as 527s for tax purposes, but only a
subset of these entities are classified as political committees under FECA § 301(d),
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2000 & Supp. 2002) and 11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2005). Unless
otherwise noted, the use of the term "527" in this Comment describes independent
political organizations that fall within § 527 of the tax code but are not currently regulated
by the FEC.
Independent 527s are distinguishable from PACs because 527s cannot formally
endorse the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates. See I.R.C. § 527. In
contrast, although run independently of any candidate, political party, corporation, or
labor union, PACs have the primary purpose of advocating for the election or defeat of
one or more clearly identified federal candidates. 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a) (defining multi-
candidate PACs). PACs are subject to FECA's contribution limits of $5,000 per
individual per year, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C), and their expenditures on behalf of a
candidate are counted as contributions to that candidate, id. § 441a(a)(7).
11. See generally Marie B. Morris, 527 Organizations: Reporting Requirements
Imposed on Political Organizations After the Enactment of P. L. 106-230 (Cong. Research
Serv. Report No. RS20650, 2001), available at http://www.opencrs.net/collections.php
(citing Pub. L. No. 93-625, which amended the tax code in 1975 to create a tax category for
political organizations, and explaining the 527 disclosure and reporting requirements
which took effect in mid-2000).
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cycle. With soft money contributions to political parties outlawed,12
contributors seeking to influence the election debate poured money
into 527 organizations.13 One member of Congress pejoratively
labeled the summer of 2004 as "the summer of 527s."'
14
Section 527 groups raised a total of $424 million in the 2004
election cycle, 5 including more than $256 million from individual
donors.16 Philanthropist and venture capitalist George Soros and
insurance magnate Peter Lewis commanded the greatest attention
from congressional reformers and political analysts for their early
public support for two 527s, America Coming Together and The
Media Fund, and for the unprecedented size of their multi-million
dollar overall contributions.17  As news stories detailed 527s'
fundraising power and chronicled the sizable contributions that 527s
attracted, s some members of Congress became concerned that 527s
12. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) § 101(a), 2 U.S.C. § 441i (2000
& Supp. 2002). In contrast, there are no limitations on the amount that donors can
contribute to 527s, although contributions of $500 or more are subject to disclosure. See
Internal Revenue Service, Filing Requirements, available at http://www.irs.gov/charities/
political/article/0,,id=96355,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
13. Steve Weissman & Ruth Hassan, BCRA and the 527 Groups, in THE ELECTION
AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT
(Michael J. Malbin ed., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2), available at http://www.
cfinst.org/studies/ElectionAfterReform/pdf[EARChapter5WeissmanHassan.pdf. The
most successful 527s during the 2004 election cycle included the Democratic-oriented
America Coming Together, the Joint Victory Fund Campaign, and the Media Fund, and
the Republican-oriented Progress for America Voter Fund and Swift Boat Veterans and
POWs for Truth. See id. (manuscript at tbls.5.4 & 5.5).
14. 151 CONG. REC. H5643 (daily ed. July 12, 2005) (statement of Rep. Pence).
15. Weismann & Hassan, supra note 13 (manuscript at 2). The Weissman and Hassan
study analyzes in-depth $405 million of the $424 million contributed in the 2004 election
cycle that had been reported to the IRS by December 12, 2004. Id. (manuscript at 3).
16. Id. (manuscript at tbl.5.1). More than half of the $256 million raised from
individual donors came from twenty-four individuals who gave each $2 million or more.
Id. The best known of these high dollar donors included George Soros ($24 million) and
Peter Lewis ($22.5 million), who gave to Democratic-oriented 527s, and Bob Perry ($8
million), Dawn Arnall ($5 million), and Alex Spanos ($5 million), who gave to
Republican-oriented 527s. Id. (manuscript at tbl.5.2).
17. See, e.g., Laura Blumenfeld, Soros's Deep Pockets vs. Bush, WASH. POST, Nov. 11,
2003, at A3 (describing efforts among Democratic political operatives to launch
independent political organizations financed by Soros and Lewis); Jeanne Cummings, A
Hard Sell on Soft Money: 'Shadow Democrats' Work Around Ban on Unlimited
Donations, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 2,2003, at A4 (same).
18. See, e.g., Grimaldi & Edsall, supra note 9 (discussing the tens of millions of dollars
raised by 527 groups, noting that all of the top ten 527 donors were on Forbes magazine's
list of the richest Americans, and reporting that eighty percent of donations to Democratic
527s and ninety percent of donations to Republican 527s came from donors contributing
$250,000 or more); Glen Justice, New Pet Cause for the Very Rich: Swaying the Election,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2004, at A12 (discussing the influx of cash from highly-ideological,
activist contributors).
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were subverting the intent of federal laws to regulate the flow of
money into elections. 19  Congressional action in 200420 and 200521
touched off a new wave of debate about the role of money in
politics.
22
In articulating the need for additional reform, policymakers
repeatedly alluded to the huge infusions of cash from a limited
number of wealthy sources as a prime rationale for subjecting 527s to
contribution limits. 23  Although the post-2004 debate focused most
intensely on seeking to curb the power of 527 organizations, recent
calls for reform can also be read more broadly as signaling a
discomfort with the role that large contributors play in funding
political discourse.24
19. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S9527 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
McCain) ("[A] number of 527 groups have been raising and spending substantial amounts
of soft money in a blatant effort to influence the outcome of this year's Presidential
election. These activities are illegal under existing laws .... ).
20. See Bill Status for S. 2828,108th Cong. (2004) and H.R. 5127, 108th Cong. (2004),
http://thomas.loc.gov/search.html (showing that both the House and Senate versions of the
2004 Reform Act were referred to committee, but no action at the committee or the full
chamber level ever occurred).
21. 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271, 109th Cong. (as introduced by Senators McCain
and Feingold, the Senate sponsors of BCRA). Former Senate Majority Leader and Rules
Committee Chairman Trent Lott introduced a substitute bill with the same name, and this
is the bill that is currently pending in the United States Senate. See 527 Reform Act of
2005, S. 1053, 109th Cong. A similar bill was introduced in the United States House of
Representatives by Representative Chris Shays, one of the House's original BCRA
sponsors. See H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2005).
22. In response to legislation focused solely on 527s, a group of House members
introduced a broader bill, titled the "527 Fairness Act," which would limit contributions to
527s while simultaneously increasing hard money contribution limits to candidates and
political parties. See 527 Fairness Act, H.R. 1316, 109th Cong. (2005); infra Part III.C.3.
23. See Hearing to Examine and Discuss S. 271,.A Bill Which Reforms the Regulatory
and Reporting Structure of Organizations Registered Under Section 527 of the Internal
Revenue Code Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter
S. 271 Hearing], available at http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2005/030805 hearing.htm
(statements of Rules Committee Chairman Trent Lott, Senator John McCain, FEC
Commissioner David Mason, and Campaign Finance Institute Executive Director Michael
Malbin). Press reports similarly characterized the "overriding goal" of reform as stopping
"donations like the $24 million that the financier George Soros contributed last year [in
2004] to defeat President Bush." Glen Justice, McCain Calls for New Limits on Money to
Political Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A14.
24. For example, virtually every discussion of 527 fundraising success mentions the
$24 million that George Soros contributed to Democratic 527s. See, e.g., Grimaldi &
Edsall, supra note 9 (noting that Soros contributed more than any other individual ever
has in a single election cycle to independent political organizations); Rainey, supra note 9
(discussing Soros contributions to MoveOn.org and America Coming Together); see also
151 CONG. REC. S905 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("[A] number of
527 groups raised and spent a substantial amount of soft money in a blatant effort to
influence the outcome of last year's Presidential election.").
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This Comment argues that the 2004 "summer of 527s ''25 provides
a lens through which policymakers and the courts should reconsider
the importance of equality of opportunity as a guiding principle in
campaign finance regulations.2 6 Inequality in citizens' ability to affect
the democratic process has ill-effects for what Justice Breyer has
called "participatory self-government. '27  Thus, this Comment
contends that the issue of greatest concern arising from the most
recent national campaign is not that large donors are "corrupting"
particular politicians or creating the appearance that their large
contributions resulted in preferential treatment.28 Rather, the sheer
size of contributions to 527s and the vast outpouring of cash by these
political groups cannot help but create the impression that one
person's $20 million contribution renders another person's twenty-
dollar contribution relatively meaningless in terms of the twenty-
dollar contributor's real or perceived ability to affect the debate. The
realization that one's participation in the political process may be
drowned out by other, more powerful, voices has the potential to
undermine participatory democracy.
29
The notion of equality touches deeply on democratic values,
including the principle that all citizens should have a fair chance to
affect the election of their leaders and shape their leaders' policy
priorities." The inequalities exposed by large contributions to 527
25. 151 CONG. REC. H5643 (daily ed. July 12,2005) (statement of Rep. Pence).
26. In 1998, evaluating the potential for "equalization" as a cognizable government
interest in regulating campaign finance, the Twentieth Century Fund Working Group on
Campaign Finance Litigation explained, "the interest claimed is not the interest in
ensuring that all speakers have the same ultimate influence, but only that they not have
completely disparate opportunities to try." E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND WORKING GROUP ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE LITIGATION,
BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM 69 (1998).
27. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245,252 (2002).
28. As discussed infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text, corruption and the
appearance of corruption have been, to date, the only interest that the Court has found
compelling enough to support limits on campaign contributions.
29. See, e.g., Mark C. Alexander, Money in Political Campaigns and Modern Vote
Dilution, 23 LAW & INEQ. 239, 239-40,248-51 (2005) (citing 527 contributions as part of a
broader argument about how the disproportionate financing of campaigns by wealthy
people and groups hampers political equality); Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem... and
the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 954-55 (2005) (arguing that "the real
vice of large individual donations" to 527s is that they allow a small number of very
wealthy donors "to play an enormous role in the political process, a role that mocks
political equality" and undermines democracy).
30. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, AM. POLITICAL
SCI. Ass'N, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 1 (2004)
("Equal political voice and democratically responsive government are widely cherished
American ideals."). The American Political Science Association convened a task force of
[Vol. 84
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organizations provide support for a body of literature on campaign
finance reform that advocates equality-focused campaign finance
laws.3 Focusing on equality as a goal of campaign finance regulation
would allow policymakers to step outside the current constraints on
regulation to craft alternative mechanisms for campaign funding,
spending, and discourse that would level the playing field for voters
and candidates alike.
Designating equality as a compelling state interest in shaping
campaign finance laws would require a significant shift in campaign
finance jurisprudence. In 1976, the United States Supreme Court in
Buckley v. Valeo32 rejected equality as a justification for regulating
campaign finance.3 The Court held that only corruption or the
appearance of corruption could justify regulation 4 and interpreted
the First Amendment in a way that limits avenues for regulation.
Additionally, some members of the current Court and members of
Congress have said that they favor significantly relaxing or abolishing
campaign finance regulations altogether. 6
noted political scientists to study the issue of inequality in American politics and
government. The task force wrote: "Failure to take urgent and concerted steps to expand
political participation and enhance democratic responsiveness-and failure to use
democratic means creatively to temper rising social disparities-will surely endanger our
longstanding democratic ideals .... " Id. at 2. Although campaign finance reform is
certainly not the sole-or even the major-vehicle by which to promote a healthier
democracy, this Comment suggests that the reform of campaign finance laws is one
component of a more comprehensive plan to promote equality in American politics and
government.
31. See infra Part I1I.B.
32. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
33. See id. at 48-49.
34. Id.
35. See infra notes 60-75 and accompanying text (explaining the current constraints
on regulation, particularly the distinction between contributions and expenditures and
between expenditures made independently of versus in coordination with a candidate or
political party).
36. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 264 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that First Amendment principles require limited or no regulation of
campaign contributions or expenditures); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
406 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's adherence to stare decisis is
misplaced, "perpetuat[ing] and compound[ing] a serious distortion of the First
Amendment resulting from our own intervention in Buckley"); Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at
412 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (questioning the Court's unwillingness to apply strict scrutiny
to the contribution limits set by Missouri state law and stating that "[t]he analytic
foundation of Buckley, however, was tenuous from the very beginning and has only
continued to erode in the intervening years"); see also 527 Fairness Act of 2005, H.R. 1316,
109th Cong. (2005) (proposing to abolish aggregate limits on the amount of money that an
individual donor can contribute to candidates, political parties, and PACs and seeking to
permit fund transfers between federal lawmakers' leadership PACs and political parties).
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At the same time, the Court in recent years has taken an
increasingly deferential approach to legislative judgments about
actual or apparent corruption and accepted the need for new laws to
prevent circumvention of existing regulations.37 Some scholars have
suggested that the Court's adherence to "corruption or appearance of
corruption" as the only rationale for regulating campaign finance is,
at best, disingenuous,38 and, at worst, harmful to democracy.39
Advocates of regulation have interpreted the Court's deferential tone
in recent cases, including McConnell v. Federal Election Commision,
as signaling a shift in its willingness to consider new justifications for
reform.4" In the last five years, several Justices, including those
Justices that have voted to uphold campaign finance restrictions4 and
those that have voted to invalidate them,42 have urged the Court to
37. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224; Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 42 (2004) (describing increased deference in
campaign finance cases since 2000).
38. See Hasen., supra note 37, at 32 ("The Court has continued to entertain the fiction
that it is adhering to the anticorruption rationale of Buckley v. Valeo .... ").
39. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Free Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy, in IF
BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN
POLITICS 63, 101 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 1999) (concluding that limiting the amount
of money in politics would promote egalitarian citizen participation); Jamin Raskin &
John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically
Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1161-62 (1994) (arguing in favor of
replacing a market-driven campaign finance system with a democracy-driven system).
40. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and
Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 85 (2004) (arguing that, by recognizing the impact
that disparities in wealth have on the political process, McConnell has the potential to shift
the terms of the campaign reform debate). Taking a less positive view of this
development, Justice Kennedy is inclined to agree. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 287
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("To reach today's decision, the Court surpasses Buckley's limits
and expands Congress's regulatory power.").
41. Justices Stevens and Breyer, both of whom voted with the majority in McConnell,
have urged reconsideration of the Buckley approach on the grounds that campaign finance
regulations should go further than they currently do. See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 398-99
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that "[m]oney is property.., not speech" and that, while
property rights are constitutionally protected, they are not entitled to the same level of
protection as speech rights); id. at 400-01, 404-05 (Breyer, J., concurring) (urging that
important constitutional interests lie on both sides of the campaign finance equation-
speech and association rights on one side and the integrity and democratization of the
electoral process on the other-and suggesting that the rigid line between contributions
and expenditure restrictions be eased or, alternatively, that Buckley be reconsidered
altogether).
42. Justices Thomas and Kennedy dissented from the majority opinion in McConnell
on Titles I and II of BCRA arguing that First Amendment principles require limited or no
regulation of campaign contributions or expenditures. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 264,
286. Each of these justices, too, has recently argued for overruling Buckley. See supra
note 36.
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revisit its application of First Amendment principles to campaign
finance regulation.43  As one scholar wrote recently, "The Court
seems to sense the imminence of a paradigm shift, but it is not sure
where the analytic road will lead."'  In fact, whether the Court will
accept alternative justifications for regulating campaign finance and
allow expenditure limits in furtherance of those alternative rationales
may be resolved during the Court's 2005 Term.45
Given the possibility of the Court's imminent reconsideration of
both the constitutionality of expenditure limits and permissible
justifications for government regulation of campaign finance, and
using the 2004 elections as a lens through which to evaluate the need
for egalitarian-oriented reform, this Comment argues in favor of
revisiting the equality rationale as a justification for campaign finance
regulation. Part I briefly summarizes the current framework for
evaluating campaign finance laws as articulated by the Court in
Buckley v. Valeo and touches on the Court's most recent decision in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.6 Part II highlights the
role that 527s played in the 2004 election. Part III explores the
empirical and doctrinal rationale for recognizing equality as a
protectable government interest in crafting and upholding campaign
finance laws, as well as the constitutional, practical, and political
barriers to this shift. Although acknowledging the potential dangers
of reform, Part IV briefly assesses the kinds of reforms and
innovations in campaign finance law that might be possible within a
revised framework.
I. BACKGROUND: CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN CONGRESS, COURT, AND
ON THE GROUND
Because the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo
continues to be the starting point for any analysis of campaign finance
laws, it is useful to summarize at the outset Buckley's key teachings
and examine Buckley's impact on subsequent congressional efforts to
43. See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 409-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
44. Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and
the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 516-17 (2004).
45. In late September 2005, the Court agreed to hear a challenge to the
constitutionality of Vermont's strict contribution limits and candidate expenditure limits in
the consolidated cases of Randall v. Sorrell, Vermont Republican State Committee v.
Sorrell, and Sorrell v. Randall. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Take on Spending Limits
for Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at Al. The Court is expected to hear the
consolidated cases in early 2006. Id.
46. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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regulate campaign finance.4 1  The function of this Part is not to
provide an exhaustive history of campaign finance law, but to show
briefly how the intersection of law and politics shapes the system in
place today.
A. Early Reform Efforts and the Buckley Framework
Congress began to regulate individual citizens' participation in
financing political campaigns in the early 1970s with the enactment of
the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA").48 In 1974, after the
Watergate scandal highlighted the potential for corruption in political
campaigns,49 Congress amended FECA ° to include a set of hard
money limits to regulate the flow of contributions into the political
process. The limits were intended to cap the amount that individual
citizens could contribute to candidates, state and national political
parties, and political action committees ("PACs").5 The 1974 and
1976 amendments also included caps on overall expenditures by
47. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRAL), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 28, and 47 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp.
2002)).
48. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). Regulation of corporate and union
contributions has existed since the early and mid-twentieth centuries, respectively. See
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101 § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (banning labor union
contributions to political campaigns); Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864
(banning corporate and bank contributions to political campaigns).
49. See ROSENKRANZ, supra note 26, at 23 (citing news report that one donor
contributed $2 million to President Nixon's re-election bid and 142 contributors gave more
than $50,000 each to Nixon's campaign).
50. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263.
51. Id. § 101(b)(1)-(3), amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 486-87 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441a
(2000)). The Amendments set a $1,000 limit on the amount any individual could
contribute to a candidate in an election cycle, a $5,000 annual limit on contributions to
state party accounts for the state party's share of federal election activities, a $20,000
annual limit on contributions to national political party organizations, a $5,000 annual
limit on contributions to political action committees, and a $25,000 annual limit on the
aggregate amount contributed to candidates, party organizations, and PACs combined.
Id. Hard money limits continue to be a fixture of the regulatory scheme. In 2002,
Congress enacted the first increase in the amount of money individuals are eligible to
contribute to political parties and federal candidates and provided that contribution limits
should be indexed for inflation. See BCRA § 307, 2 U.S.C. § 441a (increasing limits on
contributions by an individual as follows: $2,000 per election cycle to a federal candidate,
$10,000 per calendar year to a state political party, and $25,000 per year to a national
political party. Contributions to non-party PACs continue to be limited to $5,000 per
year); see also Joseph E. Cantor & L. Paige Whitaker, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002: Summary and Comparison with Previous Law 2 (Cong. Research Serv. Report No.
RL31402, 2004), available at http://www.opencrs.net/collections.php (providing
comparison chart of FECA's pre- and post-BCRA hard money limits).
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candidates themselves, the candidates' campaign committee, and
independent expenditures made in support of or opposition to a
candidate. 2 Additionally, the 1974 legislation contained reporting
and disclosure requirements for contributions and expenditures
exceeding certain dollar amounts. 3
Ruling on the constitutionality of the 1974 FECA amendments in
Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld two of the three challenged
provisions-contribution limits54 and disclosure and reporting
requirements 5 -but struck down expenditure limits. 6 The Court's
analysis in Buckley has had a lasting impact on the constitutional
framework governing campaign finance in three important respects.
First, it set up a dichotomy between contributions and expenditures. 7
Second, it set forth "corruption or the appearance of corruption" as
the only constitutionally permissible justification for regulating
campaign finance.5 8 Third, it distinguished groups whose activities are
coordinated with those of a candidate or political party from groups
whose activities are independent of a candidate or party.59 Each of
these features is discussed briefly below.
First, the Court established that an individual's First Amendment
speech and association interests are implicated by restrictions on
contributions and expenditures because of the close relationship
between money and speech. The Court said: "Discussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to
the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection
to such political expression ... ."I The Court identified FECA's
contribution limits as implicating speech and association rights only
indirectly,6 but found FECA's expenditure limits to directly burden
speech rights.62 In subsequent cases, the Court articulated a relaxed
standard for evaluating the constitutionality of contribution limits,
52. FECA Amendments of 1974 § 101(c), (e), (f).
53. Id. § 201; see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 118-19 (2003)
(summarizing the 1974 amendments).
54. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam).
55. Id. at 66-68.
56. Id. at 48-49.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 69-73.
60. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
61. Id. at 28-29.
62. Id. at 39.
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while applying a rigorous strict scrutiny standard to expenditure
limits.63
Second, balancing the incursion on an individual's First
Amendment rights against the state's interest in regulation, the
Buckley Court found only one "constitutionally sufficient" state
interest to justify regulation of contributions': preventing
"corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or
imagined coercive influence of large contributions on candidates'
positions and on their actions if elected to office."65 As discussed in
greater detail in Part III, the Court rejected the other two
justifications for regulation put forth by proponents of FECA:
"equaliz[ing] the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of
elections"66 and stemming "the skyrocketing cost of political
campaigns" to "open the political system more widely to candidates
without access to sources of large amounts of money."67 The Buckley
Court's rejection of equality is the Supreme Court's only
pronouncement on this topic.
68
Third, the Buckley Court recognized several differences between
outside groups that are affiliated in some direct or indirect way with a
particular candidate and groups that are independent. The Court
made the basic assumption that organizations that are independent of
candidates or party committees bear little risk of corruption and
therefore need little regulation.69  Distinguishing between
expenditures made by outside groups in coordination with a
candidate's campaign versus those made independently of any
candidate's formal campaign organization,"0 the Court held that the
coordinated expenditures should be considered contributions to a
candidate's campaign and, consistent with First Amendment
63. Compare Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000) ("[A]
contribution limit involving 'significant interference' with associational rights could
survive if the Government demonstrate[s] that contribution regulation [is] 'closely drawn'
to match a 'sufficiently important interest' .... ") with Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) (noting that expenditure limits that burden political
speech must be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-28.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id. at 26.
67. Id.
68. But cf infra note 221 (discussing lower courts' treatment of the equality
rationale).
69. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (explaining, in striking down expenditure caps on
independent groups, that independence "alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate").
70. Id. at 59.
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principles, could be capped.7  Conversely, expenditures made
independently of a candidate could not be similarly limited.72 The
Court explained, "a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is
to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, and
candidates. The restrictions, while neutral as to the ideas expressed,
limit political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of
the First Amendment freedoms.' " The Court applied a similar
standard when upholding a provision requiring the disclosure of funds
used to support advertising that expressly advocates the election or
defeat of a candidate,74 but striking down a disclosure requirement for
sponsors of ads that purport to address partisan election issues more
generally.
Buckley's key holdings-distinguishing between contributions
and expenditures, embracing corruption as a guiding principle of
permissible regulation, and differentiating between coordinated and
independent expenditures-created a baseline for strategies
employed by political parties and outside operatives to fund
campaign activities while remaining within the letter of the law. The
Buckley framework also served as a warning to Congress about the
Court's willingness to entertain additional regulations. As discussed
below, the Buckley paradigm has proven both unworkable in practice
and incomplete in its appreciation of the role that money plays in
politics.
76
71. Id. at 26-27.
72. Id. at 47-48.
73. Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
74. Id. at 44 n.52 (defining "express words of advocacy" as including "vote for,"
"elect," "support," "vote against," and "defeat"). This notion of "express advocacy,"
which the Court defined narrowly as applying only to communications that included words
that directly promoted, supported, attacked, or opposed a candidate, opened the door to
issue ads that steered clear of FECA's limits by avoiding these words. Until Congress
revised the standard governing express advocacy through BCRA's "electioneering
communications" provisions in 2002, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),
Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81, 88-89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2000 &
Supp. 2002)), lower courts were almost universally reluctant to imply express advocacy
where the "magic words" had not been used. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Christian
Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049, 1050 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that an issue ad criticizing
Bill Clinton did not constitute "express advocacy" because the ad's text, while clearly
intending to attack the President, did not explicitly call for his defeat).
75. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
76. BCRA itself and the rise of 527s in 2004 illustrate these realities: Congress
enacted BCRA to address soft money and issue ads, two methods by which political actors
circumvented the spirit of FECA. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text. The use
of 527s in 2004 was a means of circumventing the soft money limits that BCRA imposed.
See infra Part II.
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B. Buckley's Aftermath: Congress and the Court Respond to Soft
Money and Issue Ad Practices
Writing separately in Buckley, Chief Justice Burger worried that
"[1]imiting contributions, as a practical matter, will limit expenditures
and will put an effective ceiling on the amount of political activity and
debate that the Government will permit to take place."77  In fact,
campaign expenditures skyrocketed between 1976 and 2002.78 The
hard money contribution limits put in place in 1974--combined with
the effect of Buckley's distinction between coordinated and
independent expenditures and Federal Election Commission
("FEC") interpretations of FECA79 -led to a maze of loopholes that
allowed contributors to continue to fund political speech and other
expressive activities as long as such activities were not explicitly
coordinated with federal candidates or political parties.80 Although
campaign finance bills were introduced throughout the 1980s and
1990s, 81 Congress's only successful step toward reform before the
77. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. The website opensecrets.org, run by the Center for Responsive Politics, provides
historical data for each presidential election cycle since 1976. See Open Secrets, 2004
Presidential Election, http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/index.asp?graph=spending
(last visited Nov. 14, 2005) (providing bar chart with presidential campaign expenditures
for each election since 1976). Of course, presidential campaigns are only one source of
campaign spending. The Open Secrets website also provides historical data for the
political parties' hard money fundraising in each election cycle from 1978-88 to 2001-02
and soft money fundraising from 1991-92 to 2001-02. See Open Secrets, The Big Picture,
2002 Cycle: The Parties, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ptytots.asp?cycle=2002
(last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
79. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 123 (2003). In discussing
impact of FEC allocation rules on soft money fundraising strategies, the Court stated that:
[T]he FEC ruled that political parties could fund mixed-purpose activities-
including get-out-the-vote drives and generic party advertising-in part with soft
money .... [T]he parties could also use soft money to defray the costs of
'legislative advocacy media advertisements' even if the ads mentioned the name of
a federal candidate, so long as they did not expressly advocate the candidate's
election or defeat.
Id.
80. Id. at 122; see also Clyde Wilcox et al., With Limits Raised, Who Will Give More?
The Impact of BCRA on Individual Donors, in LIFE AFrER REFORM: WHEN THE
BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM AcT MEETS POLITICS 63 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003)
(explaining that the fixed hard money limits caused candidates to solicit contributions
from larger numbers of contributors and to seek higher average donations, spurred parties
to solicit soft money contributions from corporations, unions, interest groups, and wealthy
individuals, and led interest groups to run issue ads to increase their impact on elections).
81. See Anthony Corrado, The Legislative Odyssey of BCRA, in LIFE AFTER
REFORM, supra note 80, at 27 tbl.2.1 (enumerating the legislation that failed at various
stages of the legislative process from 1985-96). BCRA itself took six years to pass. See id
at 21.
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passage of BCRA in 2002 was the enactment of reporting provisions
for 527 organizations.82 During this time, litigation in federal courts
tended to focus on interpretations of federal and state law within the
Buckley framework,83 rather than on challenges to the Buckley
framework itself.
In the late 1990s, campaign finance abuses brought the issue to
the fore." Reformers in Congress said that their principal goal was to
"restore the regulatory framework established by FECA ... not call
for a fundamental change in the financial activities of candidates or
attempt to expand FECA."85  The practice of greatest concern
involved soft money contributions by individual contributors, national
political parties, corporations, and unions to state political party
"non-federal" accounts; the contributed funds went toward advocacy
for both federal and state candidates and for the overhead costs
associated with these activities, but were not counted toward the
contributors' hard money limits because the contribution was
technically made to a non-federal entity.86 Because the FEC
permitted this practice as consistent with FECA (and because the
82. See An Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Require 527
Organizations to Disclose Their Political Activities, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477
(2000) (current version at I.R.C. § 527(i) (2000)) (amending § 527 to require 527s not
registered to register with the FEC, disclose the fact of their formation, and report
contributions and expenditures).
83. This framework includes the assumptions that: (1) corruption is the only
acceptable rationale for regulation; and (2) restrictions on contributions are permissible,
while restrictions on expenditures are not. The meaning of coordination between parties
or outside groups and candidates has been one major source of litigation. See, e.g., Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Colo. Fed. Republican Campaign Comm. (Colorado I), 518 U.S. 604
(1996) (interpreting the meaning of "coordination" and refusing to imply coordination
between political committees and candidates where none has been proven to exist); Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (striking down an
expenditure limit on a federally-regulated PAC whose efforts were geared toward the
election or defeat of a presidential candidate when there was no direct evidence that the
PAC had coordinated with the presidential campaign). The ability of government to limit
expenditures by corporate groups has been another source of litigation. See, e.g., Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding a Michigan state law that
banned independent expenditures as applied to a nonprofit corporation whose members
are comprised of business leaders); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479
U.S. 238 (1986) (interpreting FECA to allow an ideological nonprofit to contribute
directly to federal candidates without having to form a PAC because no possibility of
corruption existed).
84. See Corrado, supra note 81, at 22, 26.
85. Id. at 22.
86. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 123-24 (2003). Recall that the
1974 amendments to FECA included hard limits on individuals' contributions to the
"federal" accounts of state parties. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002); supra
note 51.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
costs of campaigning were ever-increasing while the caps on hard
money contributions remained static), parties increasingly turned to
soft money-often contributed by donors who had already given the
maximum amount allowed in hard money-to fund campaign
activities.87
Additionally, beginning in earnest in 1996, individuals as well as
corporations and unions (sources long prohibited under federal law
from contributing directly to parties or candidates) made large soft
money contributions both to political parties and to advocacy
organizations.88 By steering clear of Buckley's "magic words" of
express advocacy,89 the funds contributed were immune to the
contribution limits that applied to parties and PACs' and to FECA's
disclosure provisions.91 The soft money contributions were used to
fund broadcast advertisements that typically aired in the period
before a federal election' and were often sponsored by organizations
that used "misleading names to conceal their identity."93 According
to a Senate report, "the ads were often actually coordinated with, and
controlled by, the campaigns.., thus provid[ing] a means for evading
FECA's candidate contribution limits.
9 4
BCRA's chief goals were plugging "the soft-money loophole"
and putting in place funding and disclosure regulations for "issue
ads."95  Implicit in the legislation itself,96 much of the impetus for
reform reflected an understanding among members of Congress and
campaign reform advocates of inequities in the way campaigns were
run and funded.' To curb the circumvention of hard money spending
87. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124 (citing an increase in soft money fundraising over
time, from $21.6 million in 1984 (five percent of all money raised by the two major parties)
to $498 million in 2000 (forty-two percent of all money raised by the two major parties)).
88. Id. at 129-32 (citing S. REP. No. 105-167 (1998)).
89. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam) (defining "express words
of advocacy" as including "vote for," "elect," "support," "vote against," and "defeat").
90. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002) (allowing maximum $5,000
contribution per year to PACs and $25,000 to national political parties).
91. Id. § 434(c) (requiring disclosure of communications funded by independent
expenditures, defined in § 431(17)(A) as an expenditure "expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate").
92. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127.
93. Id. at 128 (providing example of "Citizens for Better Medicare," an association of
drug manufacturers).
94. Id. at 130 (citing S. REP. No. 105-167 (1998)).
95. Id. at 133.
96. See, for example, BCRA, Title I, which is entitled "Reduction of Special Interest
Influence."
97. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S2958 (2001) (statement of Sen. Thompson) ("We have
gone from basically a small donor system in this country where the average person
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limits, BCRA amended FECA by placing a wall between candidate
and political party fundraising and between state and local parties and
national party organizations.98 Additionally, to regulate issue ads,
BCRA added a new section to FECA99 that defines any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication that "refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office" and is made within sixty days of a
general election or thirty days of a primary election as an
"electioneering communication.""1 ' BCRA requires the sponsors of
such ads-both individuals and organizations expending more than
$10,000-to disclose their identity, the amount disbursed, and the
identities of contributors of $1,000 or more. 10 1 Further, BCRA
clarifies that any electioneering communication made in coordination
with a candidate or party will be treated as a contribution to and
expenditure by that candidate or party."°
believed they had a stake, believed they had a voice, to one of extremely large amounts of
money .... ).
98. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) § 101(a), 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1)
(2000 & Supp. 2002) (prohibiting national political party committees from soliciting,
receiving, or directing contributions to state political parties or tax-exempt advocacy
groups "or spending any funds that are not subject to FECA's contribution limits,
prohibitions, and reporting requirements). Additional regulations prohibit state and local
political parties from using soft money for activities that influence federal elections, id.
§ 101(a), 2 § U.S.C. 441i(b), including: "voter registration activity" within 120 days of a
federal election, "voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity or generic campaign
activity" for an election in which a candidate for federal office appears on the ballot, and
sponsorship of a "public communication" that refers to a "clearly identified candidate" for
federal office and promotes/supports or opposes/attacks that candidate, id. § 101(b), 2
U.S.C. § 431(20)(A). Additionally, BCRA restricts federal candidates and federal
officeholders from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending funds in
connection with an election for federal office or any federal election activity unless the
funds were solicited and raised in accordance with FECA regulations, id. § 101(a), 2
U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1)(A), and prohibits candidates for state or local offices from funding
public communications that refer to a candidate for federal office, unless the funds have
been raised in accordance with FECA contribution limits and other regulations, id., 2
U.S.C. § 441i(f)(1).
99. Id. § 201(a), 2 U.S.C. § 434(f).
100. Id., 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A).
101. Id., 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)-(2). Additionally, the law prohibits general treasury
funds contributed by unions or corporations from being used for electioneering
communications. Id. § 203, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(1). Corporate and union PACs (which are
funded by voluntary contributions from a corporation's shareholders and a union's
members, respectively) are still permitted to produce ads using hard money. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b.
102. BCRA § 202, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7); see also 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2005) (defining
"coordinated communication" as a communication that is: (1) paid for by an independent
group; (2) contains content that explicitly endorses or opposes a particular candidate or
political party; and (3) involves explicit or implicit coordination with the independent
group in the form of a request or suggestion by the candidate or party, material
involvement by the candidate or party, "substantial" discussion between the independent
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Recognizing the inevitability of a court challenge, BCRA's
congressional sponsors took care both in drafting the law and in
developing the legislative history "to develop a legislative record that
would set forth, plainly, the basis for the various provisions of the
statute." 103 In court, the defenders of BCRA were deliberate in their
strategy-they were not interested in asking the Court to re-consider
the theory underpinning campaign finance regulation. Instead, they
merely sought to defend the statute within the current doctrinal
regime." The lawyers were, however, cognizant of the broader
implications of a broken campaign finance system and used the
Court's prior attention to the relationship between campaign finance
abuses and democracy to their advantage: "We wanted to show that
this case was not just about campaign finance regulation
technicalities, but was about something more fundamental, the
healthy functioning of our democracy and citizen participation in our
democracy. "105
In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court upheld
against First Amendment challenges all of the provisions Congress
enacted to stem the flow of soft money,0 6 as well as the
group and the candidate or party, or information-sharing by vendors, former employees,
or independent contractors employed by both the independent group and the candidate or
political party).
103. Remarks of Roger Witten, in Lessons Learned from McConnell v. FEC: An
Analysis by Key Participants in this Historic Supreme Court Case, at 8 (Jan. 14, 2004),
[hereinafter Lessons Learned], available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/
attachments/1200.pdf. Witten served as lead counsel for the congressional sponsors'
defense team. Welcome by Fred Wertheimer, in Lessons Learned, supra, at 6. Witten
elaborated further on the team's legal strategy:
We wanted to have a factual record that would make it difficult to ignore ... the
abuses perpetrated by the political parties and others .... We wanted to have a
factual record that would provoke in a judge or justice's mind, the question, can it
really be that Congress lacks the power to deal with a problem with dimensions
such as these.
Remarks of Roger Witten, supra, at 8.
104. Remarks of Roger Witten, supra note 103, at 9 ("We wanted to show that, as
breathtaking as BCRA was, it was, in the end, a loophole closing measure and
anticircumvention measure that did not require the development of new constitutional
theory to be sustained."). At least one scholar, writing four years before McConnell,
lamented this tactical approach. See Burt Neuborne, Toward A Democracy-Centered First
Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1055-56 (1999) (explaining the Court's approach
"drives equality concerns underground" and forces those seeking to justify additional
regulation as necessitated by corruption, which adds to public cynicism about politics and
"forc[es] litigants to focus on proving bribery or extortion when what is really at stake is
an effort to limit pervasive political inequality caused by massive wealth disparity").
105. Remarks of Roger Witten, supra note 103, at 9.
106. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 188-89 (2003).
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"electioneering communications" definition, the related disclosure
provisions, and the ban on union and corporation general treasury
funding of electioneering communications."°7 Election law scholars
and practioners have found significant both the level of deference the
McConnell Court accorded to Congress, as well as the Court's
invocation of "circumvention" as a variation on "corruption or the
appearance of corruption" as a valid reason for implementing
campaign finance laws.108 Some scholars posit that the Court is
signaling a greater willingness to tolerate congressional regulation,
premised in part on concerns about the health of American
democracy.0 9 As one commentator wrote, "[t]he spiraling costs of
campaigns and reliance upon unregulated interested money were
viewed as contributing to political cynicism, helping to undermine
citizen participation, and making a mockery of the nation's claim to
be a genuine democratic polity."'10 Thus, the disproportionate inputs
into the system seemed so unequal that something had to be done.
Some see this rationale-framed by the Court as "actual corruption
... and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process
through the appearance of corruption"111-as getting to something
107. Id. at 194 (rejecting plaintiffs' challenge to the definition of electioneering
communications); id. at 201-02, 212 (upholding disclosure requirements); id. at 203
(upholding coordination provisions); id. at 209 (upholding prohibition on union and
corporation financing of electioneering communications).
108. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 37, at 31, 62 (asserting that the Court's "new
jurisprudence" in the campaign finance arena is marked by legislative deference on both
the need for regulation and the means for achieving it); see also Robert F. Bauer, When
"The Pols Make the Calls": McConnell's Theory of Judicial Deference in the Twilight of
Buckley, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 5, 14-16 (2004) (stating that the Court's (misplaced)
deference to Congress was due to four features: greater congressional history with
crafting campaign finance laws, expertise in the workings of the political party system,
understanding of political reality, and experience with enforcement of campaign finance
law and potential for circumvention).
109. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 37, at 57 (arguing that the Court's decisions since 2000,
which include upholding low contribution limits, limits on political party expenditures on
behalf of candidates, and prohibitions on contributions by advocacy nonprofits, reflect an
interest in promoting what Justice Breyer has termed "participatory self-government");
Overton, supra note 40, at 82-85 (arguing that the McConnell Court's attention to the
relationship between wealth and undue influence signals a shift from the Buckley Court's
approach).
110. Allen J. Cigler, Issue Advocacy Electioneering: The Role of Money and Organized
Interests, in LAW AND ELECTION POLITICs 59,69 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2005).
111. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (reciting that Missouri espoused corruption and the appearance of
corruption as the interest underlying its contribution limit statute, stating that there is no
question about the legitimacy of this interest, and then asserting that there are ill effects
on democracy when the public perceives that its leaders are corrupt).
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more fundamental. They argue that perhaps the Court is coming to
accept the notion that inequality undermines democracy and, as a
consequence, that equality is a worthy justification for greater or
different kinds of regulations.
112
Although some interpretations of McConnell suggest the
potential for a departure from the Buckley framework, the Court's
language remained true-some say torturedly so11 3 -to Buckley.
Addressing the Title I "soft money" provisions in BCRA, the
McConnell Court said that soft money contributions lead to actual
corruption and the appearance of corruption. According to the
Court, corruption encompasses both "bribery of public officials" and
"the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of
large contributors."1"4  In balancing the incursion on contributors'
First Amendment rights against the government's interest in
regulation, the Court clarified that "a contribution limit involving
even 'a significant interference' with associational rights" is valid if it
is "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently important interest."'' 5 The
McConnell Court justified the "closely drawn" standard of review as
showing "proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing
constitutional interests in [its] area ... [of] particular expertise"" 6 and
"provid[ing] Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond
to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect
the integrity of the electoral process. "117
The McConnell Court's decision to uphold the "electioneering
communications" provisions in Title II of BCRA marked a departure
from Buckley and its progeny.1 18  The Court said that Buckley's
definition of "express advocacy," which relied upon the presence of
"magic words," was "an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a
112. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 291 (arguing that McConnell's broad conception
of "corruption" provides an opening to "break out of the Buckley box"); Hasen, supra
note 37, at 31-32 (arguing that the Court is shifting toward "upholding campaign finance
laws that promote a kind of political equality" to build public confidence, broaden a
candidate's fundraising base, and encourage greater citizen participation); Richard H.
Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 151 (2004)
(noting that McConnell expands the notion of corruption to include the appearance that
large donors get "special access" in a corruption of the democratic process).
113. Hasen, supra note 37, at 57 (characterizing the McConnell Court's decision as
"tak[ing] pains to show.., fidelity to Buckley").
114. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143 (quoting Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 389).
115. Id. at 136 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003)
(citation omitted)).
116. Id. at 137.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 84
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
first principle of constitutional law."" 9 Unpersuaded that "the First
Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-
called issue advocacy, '12° the Court pointed to expert testimony that
very few election ads, including those funded with hard money, ever
use the "magic words.' 1 21 The Court used this finding to support the
definition of electioneering communications as "easily understood
and objectionably determinable.'
22
The McConnell Court's clarification of the Buckley "express
advocacy" standard is significant in the 527 debate and has
implications for future reforms. While the FEC previously only
regulated PACs that were, by definition, expressly identified with a
candidate or group of candidates, 23 McConnell opens the door to
regulation of advocacy organizations that, while nominally
independent of candidates and political parties, clearly have a
message targeted at influencing a specific federal election. 24
Additionally, BCRA's prohibition on the use of corporate and union
contributions in funding electioneering communications, combined
with the express provision allowing 527s to fund electioneering
communications with individual donations, made the role of
individual wealthy donors to 527s all the more important during the
2004 elections.
II. THE 2004 ELECTIONS AND THE RISE OF 527s HIGHLIGHT
INEQUALITY
This Part briefly outlines the role that 527s played in the 2004
elections and summarizes subsequent calls for FEC regulation of 527
organizations. It is important to clarify that this Part examines the
current 527 debate more for what the debate reveals about the
incomplete nature of "corruption and the appearance of corruption"
119. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190-91 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976)
(per curiam)).
120. Id. at 193.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 194. The Court also noted that the "express advocacy line ... has not aided
in the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress enacted
BCRA to correct the flaws it found in the existing system." Id.
123. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2000); 11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2005) (defining political
committee); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80 (explaining permissible political committee
disclosure provisions).
124. This battle is currently being waged by Representatives Shays and Meehan and
the Bush-Cheney Committee in district court, where the plaintiffs are arguing that FECA,
as interpreted by the McConnell Court, requires the FEC to regulate 527s. See Shays v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 04 Civ. 1597 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 14, 2004).
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as a guiding principle in campaign finance regulations 125 than for the
proposition that curbing 527 activity in itself would have any real,
lasting impact on the state of American democracy.
The 2004 general election was the first in which the soft money
prohibitions on political party fundraising enacted in BCRA were in
effect, but the headlines throughout the 2004 election cycle focused as
much on 527 organizations as on the direct impact of BCRA's
reforms. 126  BCRA itself does nothing to proscribe the fundraising
activities of the independent 527 political organizations that gained
notoriety during the 2004 election cycle, other than to prohibit
political parties from donating to these groups2 7 and federal
candidates from fundraising on behalf of them.2 s Significantly,
Congress acknowledged that 527 organizations could be possible
conduits for soft money, but chose not to regulate the activities of
these organizations. 129 Thus, while BCRA did not "create" the 527
loophole, it tacitly acknowledged the possibility of the loophole's
existence. As the Supreme Court itself acknowledged with its
"money, like water" admonition in McConnell,13 ° it is not surprising
that political actors and contributors would find another way to
influence the political process.
131
125. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
126. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 9, 17; sources cited infra notes 132-33; see also
Briffault, supra note 29, at 949 & n.1 (stating that, during the 2004 election cycle, "In the
world of campaign finance, 2004 was without a doubt the year of the 527 organization. No
other aspect of campaign financing received as much press coverage or public attention as
the rise of the 527s," and reporting that, of the thirty-one stories about the 2004 elections
and campaign finance in the New York Times during 2004, sixteen addressed 527s while no
more than two or three articles addressed any other single topic).
127. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), § 101(a), 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d)
(prohibiting political parties from soliciting money for or donating funds to tax-exempt
"501(c)" organizations engaged in electioneering activities or designated as political
organizations organized under § 527 of the tax code).
128. Id., 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1) (prohibiting federal candidates from "solicit[ing],
receiv[ing], direct[ing], transfer[ing], or spend[ing]" soft money on behalf of national or
state parties, independent 527s engaged in federal election activities, or PACs).
129. See H.R. REP. No. 107-131, pt. 1, at 2 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 106,
106-07 ("Rather than diminish the power of 'special interest' groups, [BCRA] would
actually make these groups even more powerful than they are today."); see also Mitch
McConnell, The Future Is Now, 3 ELECTION L. J. 123, 123 (2004) (predicting that 527s
would become "king of a soft money monarchy").
130. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93,224 (2003).
131. For a recent, influential treatment of the unintended consequences of campaign
finance reform efforts, see Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 8, at 1705 (critiquing "the law
of political motion" and noting that "every reform effort to constrain political actors
produces a corresponding series of reactions by those with power to hold onto it").
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As soon as the Court upheld the major provisions of BCRA,
reformers worried that independent 527s were becoming " 'pass-
throughs' or 'conduits' for labor unions seeking to use treasury money
for partisan registration and turnout efforts.' 32  Commentators
immediately predicted that the ban on party soft money would shift
"influence to outside groups and their wealthy donors, who [will] now
financ[e] activities that the parties ... [are] no longer able to"
support.13  At the end of the election cycle, predictions about wealthy
donor dominance proved accurate. 34 Independent 527 political
organizations raised a total of $424 million in the 2004 election
cycle,135 more than $256 million of which came from individual
donors.36 By the end of the election cycle, 113 people donated at
132. Thomas B. Edsall, Democratic 'Shadow' Groups Face Scrutiny: GOP, Watchdogs
To Challenge Fundraising, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2003, at A5 (explaining "watchdog"
organizations' concerns); see also Thomas B. Edsall, Money, Votes Pursued for Democrats,
WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2003, at A8 (reporting on donations to Democratic 527s from
individuals, organized labor, environmentalists, civil rights organizations, and trial
lawyers). Ultimately, concerns about large individual contributions eclipsed concern
about union and corporate contributions, in large part because corporations gave less to
527s than some commentators initially expected. See Weissman & Hassan, supra note 13
(manuscript at 10) (reporting that business donations to 527s, including donations by
corporations, trade associations, and individual incorporated entities, declined from $32
million in 2002 to $30 million in 2004 and reporting that, although donations from labor
unions rose from $55 million in 2002 to $94 million in 2004, this fact has been largely
eclipsed by attention to individual wealthy donors like Soros).
133. Jeanne Cummings et al., Supreme Court Upholds Key Parts of New Campaign-
Finance Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2003, at Al; cf Thomas E. Mann & Norman Ornstein,
Editorial, So Far, So Good on Campaign Finance Reform, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2004, at
A19 (dismissing claims of BCRA's critics). Indeed, post-election analyses reveal that 527s
were able to finance more than $400 million worth of broadcast advertising, direct mail,
grassroots voter registration, and get-out-the-vote efforts that, while not coordinated with
a campaign or political party effort, made clear appeals on behalf of or in opposition to
particular candidates and parties. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, 527s in 2004 Shatter Previous
Records for Political Fundraising (2004), http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/report.aspx?
aid=435.
134. This was true, at least, in terms of 527 fundraising. See Weissman & Hassan, supra
note 13 (manuscript at tbl.5.1). In contrast, the political parties actually relied more on
small donors than in the past. In 2004, 32% of George Bush's hard money donations and
31% of John Kerry's hard money donations came from contributions of $200 or less. See
Open Secrets, 2004 Election Overview: 2004 Donor Demographics, http://www.
opensecrets.org/presidential/donordems.asp?filter=A&sortby=2 (last visited Nov. 14,
2005) (presenting chart showing contributions of all donors by number and percentage).
In comparison, in 2000, 10.5% of George Bush's hard money contributions and 10% of Al
Gore's hard money contributions came in amounts of $200 or less. See Open Secrets, 2000
Presidential Race, Source of Funds, http://www.opensecrets.org/2000elect/source/
AllCands.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2005) (showing pie chart for each candidate that
illustrates the candidate's source of funds).
135. Weissman & Hassan, supra note 13 (manuscript at 2).
136. Id. (manuscript at tbl.5.1).
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least $250,000 apiece to 527s and these donations together accounted
for $207 million, or eighty-one percent of individual donations.'37
Additionally, nearly $178 million, or just under forty-four percent of
the total amount 527s raised by the end of 2004,138 came from fifty
two individual contributors who each gave $1 million or more,
including twenty-four contributors who each gave $2 million dollars
or more.139  Between 2002 and 2004, individual giving to 527s
increased exponentially, from just over $37 million to more than $256
million.140 The number of donors who were willing to give $100,000
or more accounts for part of the explosion in 527 fundraising;'' the
other key component of 527 fundraising success in 2004 is due to the
twenty-four $2 million-plus dollar donors.42
The mega-contributions made during the 2004 campaign season
illustrate most vividly the inequalities that marked the 2004 elections.
The Washington Post editorial page lamented about George Soros's
initial $10 million pledge to America Coming Together and Soros's
additional multi-million dollar pledges to other progressive
organizations: "There remains something unsettling about those
Soros checks .... [S]uch outsize voices, on the left or right, pose
dangers to a democratic system."'43  While Soros was not seeking
particular political favors-that is, his contributions do not perpetuate
"corruption" or "the appearance of corruption"-million-plus dollar
contributions did allow Soros and other large contributors to have a
disproportionate impact on campaign season discourse.' 4 As efforts
to reform 527s moved forward, the influence of these wealthy
contributors attracted a great deal of attention and stimulated debate
about the propriety of large political contributions.
137. Id. (manuscript at 12). Only donations of $5,000 or more were considered by the
Weissman and Hassan study.
138. See id. (manuscript at 3) (stating that 527s raised $405 million by the end of 2004);
id. (manuscript at tbl.5.1) (showing $178 million coming from individual donations of $1
million or more).
139. Id. (manuscript at tbl.5.1).
140. Id. (manuscript at 12 & tbl.5.1).
141. Id. (manuscript at 12) (stating that the number of contributors giving $100,000 or
more increased from 66 in 2002 to 265 in 2004).
142. Id. (manuscript at 12).
143. Editorial, Mr. Soros' Millions, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2003, at A20.
144. In summing up the influence of 527s in the 2004 election, columnist David Broder
focused on the groups' TV ad campaigns, "often of the nastiest variety." David S. Broder,
Editorial, An Unlikely Campaign Reformer, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A21. Broder
called Democrats "the main abusers, with billionaire George Soros and friends financing a
network of groups run by longtime party and labor activists" but noted that "Republicans
drew even more blood, thanks to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ads questioning John
Kerry's service in Vietnam." Id.
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By early 2005, members of Congress and outside pro-reform
groups were calling for limits on the vast amount of money that
individuals could contribute to political organizations.
145
Additionally, Representatives Shays and Meehan and the Bush-
Cheney '04 campaign filed actions in federal district court, arguing
that the FEC is required by FECA to regulate 527s and requesting
that the court order the Commission to do S0.146 As the popular and
scholarly debate has unfolded, attention has consistently focused not
on the corruption concerns that have been typical of discussions
surrounding campaign finance reform in the nearly thirty years since
Buckley, but on something more fundamental to democracy-the
inherent inequality in permitting wealthy donors to dominate the
electoral debate while leaving other citizens with little practical ability
to participate in politics in an equally effective way.
Despite increasing concerns about the inequality that underlies
campaign financing, the current "corruption and appearance of
corruption" rationale for campaign finance regulation and the
Buckley Court's reading of the First Amendment 14 7 limits the ability
of Congress and state legislatures to act. Under the current regime,
only individual contributions to political parties, candidates, and
PACs are capped. Thus, the donations of wealthy contributors may
be brought "in house ' 14 or diffused widely among an ever-
proliferating array of political organizations, but their influence in
shaping the national dialogue is still disproportionate. This inequality
145. Justice, supra note 23 (reporting on the introduction of S. 271 and identifying
Senator Trent Lott, an opponent of BCRA, as well as Senators Feingold and Schumer, as
527 reform supporters).
146. Shays v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 04 Civ. 1597 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 14, 2004);
Bush-Cheney '04 v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 04 Civ. 1612 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 17, 2004)
(consolidated by Judge Emmett Sullivan of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia with the Shays action). The FEC explicitly declined to regulate 527s
during the 2004 cycle. See Political Committee Status, supra note 5, at 68,064-65; see also
S. 271 Hearing, supra note 23 (statement of Sen. McCain) (calling new 527 legislation
necessary "to overcome the FEC's failure to properly interpret the original Federal
Election Campaign Act"); S. 271 Hearing, supra note 23 (statement of Sen. Feingold)
("[W]e are here because the FEC has failed to do its job enforcing a law that is now over
30 years old.").
147. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that
independent expenditure limits "heavily burden[] core First Amendment expression" and
that "[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled
to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of public policy generally or
advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation").
148. See, e.g., GeorgeSoros.com, http://www.georgesoros.com (last visited Nov. 14,
2005) (describing Soros's independently funded 2004 election activities, which included
the publication of an ad in fifty newspapers, a twelve-city speaking tour, and the
production of an anti-George W. Bush book).
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diminishes the opportunity of all citizens to participate with equal
force in democratic debate149  and has potentially adverse
consequences for citizen political engagement more broadly.a0
Although, in the aftermath of the 2004 elections, reform efforts have
focused primarily on curbing the use of a particular type of election
instrumentality151-527 organizations-527s are just a symptom of a
campaign finance regime that, since Buckley, has focused too
narrowly on one goal and ignored other equally important
government interests in regulation.152
III. THE NOT-So-NEW PARADIGM FOR REFORM: EQUALITY AND
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
Because the Buckley Court considered the expenditure of money
by independent groups and candidates to be equivalent to speech,'53
proposals to limit expenditures or otherwise fundamentally alter the
campaign finance regulatory scheme are limited. Thus, as Professor
Tobin noted, "George Soros, Bill Gates, or anyone else with a
sizeable fortune[] can spend unlimited funds on behalf of a candidate
149. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and
Campaign Finance, 80 TEx. L. REV. 987, 989 (2002) ("By using the First Amendment to
undermine legislative restrictions on the use of political money, courts effectively enshrine
the existing distribution of property as a baseline for political advantage.").
150. See discussion infra Part III.A.
151. But see discussion infra Part III.C.3 (discussing the splintering of the pro-reform
coalition in Congress and the introduction of proposals that would increase opportunities
for hard money contributions to political parties and ease restrictions on federal
lawmakers' transfer of funds from leadership PACs to political party organizations).
152. The Court's narrow focus on corruption and the appearance of corruption calls
into doubt whether regulation of 527s is even constitutional under First Amendment
campaign finance principles. See Edward B. Foley & Donald Tobin, The New Loophole?:
527s, Political Committees, and McCain-Feingold, BNA MONEY & POLITICS, Jan. 7, 2004,
available at http://www.moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/docs/the-new-loophole.html (positing
that the outcome of a constitutional challenge to 527 regulation would depend on the
"strength of the evidence that the Government can develop regarding the potential risk of
corruption resulting from large-dollar donations to 'political committees,' as distinct from
other politically motivated interest groups"); Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
Regulation 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1027 (2005) (arguing that
527 regulation would be unconstitutional). However, the McConnell Court's deference to
congressional judgment, see McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 161, 224
(2003), could persuade the Court to uphold legislation aimed at 527 regulation. The
changing composition of the Court may also affect the Court's willingness to uphold new
campaign finance laws. See, e.g., Editorial, Stakes for the Court, WASH. POST, July 21,
2005, at A22 (explaining that Justice O'Connor provided a crucial fifth vote to uphold
BCRA).
153. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976) (per curiam).
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of his or her choice. 154 While some argue that more speech is almost
always better for promoting healthy democratic debate and
participation,1 5 the 527 experience raises questions about whether
more speech, funded by a few, is normatively desirable. The 527
experience thus creates the newest chapter in the debate over which
core democratic value-expression or equality-should shape
campaign finance laws.156 Perhaps the McConnell Court's supposition
that negative perceptions of large donors could " 'jeopardize the
willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance' 157 is not
tied as much to the appearance of corruption as to a sense of
disempowerment that results when wealthy people disproportionately
fuel the content of the debate.'58 Arguably, the influence of large
contributions in political discourse continues to conflict with the
democratization of political participation that has characterized
American government since the mid-nineteenth century.5 9
154. Donald B. Tobin, New 527 Bill Plugs Some Major Holes, But Is It Constitutional?,
Election Law @ Moritz Election Commentary (Feb. 22, 2005), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/comments/2005/commentO222.html.
155. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences
of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1090 (1996) (arguing that "the First
Amendment should itself be seen as a considered response to problems inherent in any
democratic system of elections" by freeing actors within the political system to engage in a
"full interplay of political ideas," prohibiting incumbent self-dealing, improving the
viability of electoral challengers, and "free[ing] individuals wishing to engage in political
discourse from the regulation that now restrains grassroots political activity"); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 688
(1997) (advocating for deregulation of all laws except for meaningful compelled disclosure
of contributions).
156. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 155, at 667 ("Buckley involved nothing less than a
choice between two of our most powerful traditions: equality in the realm of democratic
polity, and liberty in the realm of political speech."); see also J. TOBIN GRANT & THOMAS
J. RUDOLPH, EXPRESSION VS. EQUALITY: THE POLITICS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM 1-2 (2004) (providing examples of the invocation of these values during
congressional debate on BCRA).
157. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377,390 (2000)).
158. This, of course, is an empirical question. However, survey research conducted on
BCRA and campaign finance reform focuses almost exclusively on corruption and
influence. See generally Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and
Campaign Finance, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2004) (surveying polling data on campaign
finance reform). See also infra notes 187-94 (discussing data limitations).
159. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting the denial of voting rights based on
race); id. at amend. XIX (extending suffrage rights to women); id. at amend. XXIV
(prohibiting a poll tax); id. at amend. XXVI (setting eighteen as the national voting age).
But see BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH 211-12 (2001) (arguing that the individual
access to the ballot box guaranteed by these amendments is the only type of equality the
Constitution requires).
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Anticipating the problematic role of large contributions by
wealthy individuals ten years before the free-spending 2004 elections,
professor and former government lawyer David Strauss wrote that "a
necessary target of any egalitarian campaign finance reform is large
contributions by wealthy individuals .... [F]or people to use their
exceptionally large personal wealth to promote their private political
agenda is the clearest breach of the 'one person, one vote' ideal."1"
After McConnell, scholars wondered whether the Court's decision
could be marshaled by reformers to argue for a new paradigm.16 ' The
2004 elections provide additional impetus for reevaluating the
justifications for campaign finance regulation through the lenses of
social science, political debate, and legal argument. The Court's
decision to hear argument in early 2006 on Vermont's restrictive
campaign finance laws" make this reexamination particularly timely.
A. Why Equality?
Using equality as a guiding principle in campaign finance
regulations encompasses more than just the literal ability of citizens
to contribute to campaigns. A critical, broader goal of egalitarian
reform is encouraging the belief among all citizens that their
engagement in the political process can make a difference. The term
160. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1387-88 (1994). The one person-one vote language originated with
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), and constitutes a bedrock principle of voting
rights law. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) (per curiam) (disavowing
the applicability of the Court's jurisprudence on voting-i.e., the "one person, one vote"
ideal-in the campaign finance context: "[T]he principles that underlie invalidation of
governmentally imposed restrictions on the franchise do not justify governmentally
imposed restrictions on political expression. Democracy depends on a well-informed
electorate, not a citizenry legislatively limited in its ability to discuss and debate candidates
and issues.").
161. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 999 ("[B]y enabling a handful of individuals to
commit literally millions of dollars to the election campaign, the rise of the 527s is a
challenge to the political equality at the heart of democracy. By the same token, the rise
of the 527s is also a challenge to the Supreme Court to break with Buckley's rejection of
equality as a component of campaign finance law and to see that dramatic funding
inequalities present a compelling problem that Congress can address."); see also
Comments by Richard Briffault, in Lessons Learned, supra note 103, at 34 ("In
McConnell, the Court stated that campaign finance restrictions ... can promote public
participation .... [T]o the extent that unlimited spending clashes with political equality
values[,J ... widely uneven spending is not consistent with fair competition and, thus, with
democracy."); Comments by Spencer Overton, in Lessons Learned, supra note 103, at 44
("McConnell shows that there are values other than the absolute right to use limitless
amounts of money. It shows that there are values like democratic integrity, widespread
participation, and government that's responsive to the will of the people.").
162. See Greenhouse, supra note 45.
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political scientists use to describe the belief that one can make a
difference in the political process is "efficacy." Efficacy can be
further divided into "internal efficacy," or the sense that one is
qualified to understand and participate in politics and "external
efficacy," or the sense that one's political activities have the capacity
to affect government actions. 63 This Comment contends that
equality-oriented campaign finance laws would have a positive effect
on citizens' external efficacy.
Campaign contributions have long been a form of political
participation for just a small share of the population.164 In 2004, only
fifteen percent of American voters reported contributing any amount
to a presidential candidate's campaign.165 One half of one percent of
the American adult population (.52%) contributed $200 or more (the
threshold for reporting under FECA) to a candidate, party, or PAC
in 2004,16 and just over one-tenth of one percent of the adult
population (.12%) contributed $2,000 or more. 67 To be sure, it is not
163. See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION,
PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 15 (1993). Political scientists often use
the following two "agree/disagree" questions from the American National Election Study
to operationalize efficacy: (1) "I don't think public officials care much what people like
me think"; and (2) "People like me don't have any say about what the government does."
Id. at 258; accord Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier et al., The Effects of Campaign Finance
Attitudes on Turnout and Vote Choice in the 2000 Elections, in MODELS OF VOTING IN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 85, 101 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2004)
(explaining methodology used to study the effect of views on campaign finance on voter
turnout and partisan candidate choice, using nearly identical efficacy measures); David M.
Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the
States, 5 ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (June 2005 manuscript at 14), available at
http://www.rochester.edu/college/psc/primo/primomilyoelj.pdf (using nearly identical
efficacy measures).
164. THE NES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: GAVE
MONEY TO HELP A CAMPAIGN 1952-2002 tbl.6b.5 (Am. Nat. Election Study ed.),
http://www.umich.edu!%7Enes/nesguide/toptable/tab6b_5.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2005)
(providing survey data from 1952 through 2002 on the percentage of Americans reporting
contributions to any political candidate or political party in each given election year and
indicating that between seven and nine percent of Americans surveyed reported
contributing money to any individual candidate or a political party in each presidential
election year between 1980 and 2000).
165. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Voters Liked Campaign 2004,
But Too Much 'Mud-Slinging' (Nov. 11, 2004), available at http://people-press.org/
reports/display.php3?ReportlD=233.
166. Open Secrets, 2004 Election Overview: Donor Demographics, http://www
.opensecrets.org/overview/DonorDemographics.asp?cycle=2004 (last visited Nov. 15,
2005) (providing percentage and dollar amounts of contributions of $200 or more reported
to the FEC).
167. Id. During the 2000 election cycle, an even smaller percentage of the United
States adult population contributed $200 or more (.37%), but a slightly higher percentage
contributed $2,000 or more (.16%). Open Secrets, The Big Picture 2000 Cycle: Donor
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surprising that a citizen's income level affects his or her ability to
contribute to election campaigns or that contributors are more likely
than non-contributors to have disposable income available for
political participation. 68 Barring incentives for more widespread
private contributions to political campaign efforts, 69 it is not
reasonable to think that a wider cross-section of Americans will
donate to campaigns. Thus, a primary goal of campaign finance law
must be to assure "average" citizens that, despite their lack of
participation in funding politics, their political participation in other
ways is equally fruitful. 7 '
The 2004 election highlights the salience of this broader goal.
With press attention focused on million or multi-million dollar
contributions by single individuals that drive the political debate,
average citizens arguably cannot help but be left with the sense that,
personal income aside, an individual's small contribution just does not
matter very much. 71 Over the long term, such feelings of inefficacy
could have negative effects on voting propensity 172 and, ultimately,
public policy. Public opinion data, political science theory and
research, and the experiences of policymakers themselves weigh in
Demographics, http://www.opensecrets.orglbigpicture/DonorDemographics.asp? Cycle=
2000&filter=A (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
168. See, e.g., THE NES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR:
GAVE MONEY TO HELP A CAMPAIGN 1952-2002, PERCENT AMONG DEMOGRAPHIC
GROUPS WHO RESPONDED: "YES" tbl.6b.5.2 (Am. Nat. Election Study ed.),
http://www.umich.edu/%7Enes/nesguide/2ndtable/t6b_5_2.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005)
(providing percentage of citizens reporting contributions to political candidates or party
by income level and showing vast disparities in each year from 1952 to 2002 in self-
reported contributions by those at the highest income level versus those at lower income
levels).
169. Some reformers have suggested just such incentives. See infra note 306 and
accompanying text.
170. Although the full range of proposals aimed at accomplishing this objective are
beyond the scope of this Comment, some potentially promising reforms are discussed in
Part IV.
171. On a related point, see Antonio Gonzalez & Stephanie Moore, Op-Ed, Wealthy
Campaign Donors Stifle Minority Voices, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2003, at 23A, available at
LEXIS, News & Business File, which discusses the link between high dollar donations and
the disproportionate influence of wealthy white donors in politics.
172. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 163, at 144-45 (illustrating drop in external
efficacy from 1952 to 1990 and asserting that, in their model, people with the strongest
sense of external efficacy were 10.6% more likely to vote than those with the weakest
sense of efficacy). Despite any feelings of disempowerment that may have occurred in
2004, however, voter turnout was not affected. In fact, the 2004 presidential election saw
higher voter turnout than in 2000. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau
Reports, U.S. Voter Turnout Up in 2004 (May 26, 2005). However, this statistic cannot
reveal anything about the longer term impact of elections dominated by news about
wealthy contributors.
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favor of this conclusion and the suggestion that equality-oriented
regulation could ameliorate the problem. Each of these will be
discussed in turn below. Although some opponents of regulation
argue that, by lifting rather than heightening restrictions on campaign
finance, the interests of efficacy and vigorous public participation in
political life will be better served,173  the data, theory, and
policymakers' perspectives outlined below belie this line of argument.
1. Empirical Data
Existing public opinion data illustrate the public's negative
perceptions of the impact of large contributions on political discourse
and decisionmaking and the public's sense that campaign contributors
have more influence than average citizens on policymakers' actions.'
A study conducted in 2002 by a bipartisan team of public opinion
researchers (the "Mellman-Wirthlin Report")175 provides the most
comprehensive evidence to date of public perceptions of the influence
of large contributions on political leaders.'76 The Mellman-Wirthlin
Report found that people are cynical about the link between political
contributions and government decisionmaking. Sixty-two percent of
Americans said they disagree that government can be trusted to make
fair decisions despite big campaign contributions. 77  Only 27%
173. See SMITH, supra note 159, at 205-13, 223-27.
174. A search conducted on September 16, 2005 of National Journal's "Poll Track"
database of publicly-released public opinion surveys revealed that none of the public
opinion polls conducted during or after the 2004 elections asked specifically about 527s or
the contributions of wealthy donors in the 2004 election. Thus, this Comment relies on
and extrapolates from data collected earlier.
175. MARK MELLMAN & RICHARD WIRTHLIN, RESEARCH FINDINGS OF A
TELEPHONE STUDY AMONG 1300 ADULT AMERICANS (2002), http://www.campaign
legalcenter.org/attachments/84.pdf [hereinafter MELLMAN-WIRTHLIN REPORT]. The
survey results have a margin of sampling error of 2.7 percentage points. Id. at 22. The
United States Justice Department commissioned the Mellman-Wirthlin Report in
preparation for defending BCRA. Persily & Lammie, supra note 158, at 139.
176. Although the United States Supreme Court did not address the findings from this
survey in reaching its decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93
(2003), the three-judge panel in the District Court for the District of Columbia did. See
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 229 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam);
id. at 512-14 (mem. op. of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (incorporating survey findings into findings
of fact on "Public Perceptions of Corruption"); id. at 784 n.80, 800 & n.117, 870-72 (mem.
op. of Leon, J.) (same). But see id. at 354-55 (mem. op. of Henderson, J.) (rejecting
significance of public opinion data).
177. MELLMAN-WIRTHLIN REPORT, supra note 175, at 35 q.19F. The question
provided respondents with the information that "individuals, issue groups, corporations,
and labor unions" are permitted by law to make $50,000 contributions to political parties
and then asked respondents whether and how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the
following statement: "The government can be trusted to make fair decisions even when so
much big money is involved." Id. The responses were distributed as follows: 34% agreed
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reported believing that "Members of Congress will do the right thing
no matter who has given money to their political party.1 78  Put
differently, Americans overwhelmingly believe that political
contributions tinge the policymaking process: 77% said they believe
that "big contributions to political parties" have either a great deal or
some impact on "decisions made by the federal government in
Washington, D.C."'1 79 This statistic is similar to the results of a study
conducted two years earlier for The Nation magazine, in which nearly
three-quarters of voters (73%) said they believe that members of
Congress make decisions based on what political contributors want at
least half the time. 8°
Additionally, the Mellman-Wirthlin Report found strong
evidence that voters believe that politicians give more weight to
political donors' views than to the politician's own perceptions about
what is best for the country or their constituents' preferences.
Seventy-one percent of the survey respondents said they believe that
members of Congress "sometimes decide how to vote on an issue
based on what big contributors to their political party want" even if
it's not what the member thinks is best'81 or what the majority of the
member's constituents want.) 2 In a separate question, 81% of survey
(9% strongly, 24% somewhat); 62% disagreed (37% strongly, 25% somewhat); 4%
volunteered that they neither agreed nor disagreed. Id.
178. Id. at 33 q.19B.
179. Id. at 27 q.7. More than a majority (55%) affirmatively said that such
contributions have "a great deal" of impact on federal government decisionmaking. Id.
180. LAKE SNELL PERRY & ASSOCIATES, SURVEY FOR THE NATION MAGAZINE OF
1000 REGISTERED VOTERS AND 200 DONORS 5 q.15 (2000); see also Celinda Lake &
Robert L. Borosage, Money Talks, NATION, Aug. 21, 2000, at 29, 31, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20000821/lake. In the interest of full disclosure, the author
was a senior research analyst at Lake Snell Perry & Associates during the time this survey
was conducted, but did not participate in the fielding or analysis of this particular study.
181. MELLMAN-WIRTHLIN REPORT, supra note 175, at 29 q.12. The question asked
was:
Do you think members of Congress sometimes decide how to vote on an issue
based on what big contributors to their political party want, even if it's not what
they think is best for the country, or do you think this doesn't happen, or don't you
have an opinion on this?
Id. The breakdown of responses was as follows: yes, does happen: 71%; no, doesn't
happen: 9%; no opinion: 20%. Id.
182. Id. q.11. The question asked was:
Do you think members of Congress sometimes decide how to vote on an issue
based on what big contributors to their political party want, even if it's not what
most people in their districts want, or do you think this doesn't happen, or don't
you have an opinion on this?
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respondents said they believe it likely that members of Congress
would give "special consideration" to the opinion of an "individual,
issue group, corporation, or labor union" that had donated $50,000 or
more to the member's political party;'83 80% also said they believe
that a member would give special consideration to a donor who had
spent $50,000 or more on political radio or television ads that
benefited the member.184 In contrast, just 24% said it would be likely
that a member would give "the opinion of someone like you special
consideration.118 5 Finally, the Mellman-Wirthlin Report also captures
uncertainty among Americans about whether their own views are
represented by interest groups that donate to political parties. Asked
whether "my views are represented in Washington, D.C., by some of
the groups that make large contributions to political parties," just
41% of survey respondents agreed while 46% disagreed.
186
Although these data offer insight into the public's perceptions of
the role of money in politics, 187 they do not capture second-order
effects-the resulting lack of efficacy and trust that arises from the
perception that politicians are unduly influenced by large
contributors. 88 Because legislation and litigation since the Buckley
decision have focused almost exclusively on justifying regulation
based on corruption or the appearance of corruption, supporters and
opponents of campaign finance reform have focused only on this issue
in commissioning data to bolster their position.'89 Thus, for example,
Id. The breakdown of responses was as follows: yes, does happen: 71%; no, doesn't
happen: 7%, no opinion: 21%; don't know/refused: 1%. Id.
183. Id. at 30 q.14. Just 9% said it would be "somewhat" or "very" unlikely for a
member to give special consideration to such a contributor's views. Id.
184. Id. at 31 q.16. Just 10% said it would be "somewhat" or "very" unlikely for a
member to give special consideration to such a contributor's views. Id.
185. Id. at 30 q.15. Nearly seven in ten respondents (69%) said a member would be
unlikely to give special consideration to the views of someone like them. Id.
186. Id. at 33 q.19C.
187. Two of the judges on the three-judge panel that initially heard the McConnell case
incorporated the Mellman-Wirthlin Report findings into their findings of fact on "Public
Perception of Corruption." Judge Kollar-Kotelly concluded, "It is clear that the effect of
large contributions on the political process has not been lost on the public. The polling
surveys entered into the record provide powerful proof that the presence of large
donations create the appearance of corruption in the eyes of the majority of Americans."
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 517 (D.D.C. 2003) (mem. op. of
Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
188. See Persily & Lammie, supra note 158, at 134 (explaining that existing opinion
polls "do not actually tap into the second order effects that form the justification for the
Supreme Court's inclusion of 'appearances' [of corruption] as a unique state interest").
189. Cf. Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir.) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(stating that, because of Buckley, all of the scholarship on campaign finance reform has
focused on the "subsidiary goals" of stemming corruption and guarding against incumbent
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the Mellman-Wirthlin Report focused largely on perceptions of the
influence that large contributors have relative to other participants in
the political process, 19° but not on measuring any corresponding
effects in citizens' sense of their own "value" or efficacy in the
political system. To date, only one empirical study has attempted to
make the connection between campaign finance laws and political
efficacy, and the results of that study-while casting doubt on a
connection-are inconclusive.19' Others have tried to argue that
because, historically, there has been no correlation between the
contemporary campaign finance regulatory regime and survey data
on Americans' level of trust in government, changes in campaign
finance laws will not affect Americans' perceptions of the political
system."9 This argument is specious, however, because it does not
address the very real possibility that existing campaign finance laws
have never been adequately responsive to underlying concerns about
the inequalities that stem from the role of money in politics and, thus,
longitudinal surveys simply reflect citizens' continuing discontent.19
Additional empirical analysis of the connection between views
of the political system and government generally, political fundraising
practices, and measures of external efficacy are needed to better
assess the relationship between widespread public perceptions that
protection), cert. granted sub nom., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005). See generally
Persily & Lammie, supra note 158 (providing an overview of public opinion data).
190. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
191. Primo & Milyo, supra note 163 (June 2005 manuscript at 27 tbl.2) (providing
results of a model that shows a statistically insignificant relationship between: (1)
expenditure limits and efficacy; and (2) organizational and individual contribution limits
and efficacy).
192. Whitfield Ayres, The Reform Act Will Not Reduce the Appearance of Corruption
in American Politics, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE 270, 272-73 (Corrado
et al. eds., 2003) (arguing that BCRA would have no effect on Americans' trust in
government). But see Robert Y. Shapiro, Rebuttal to Ayres, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE BATTLE, supra, at 278, 283 (explaining that Ayres reached his conclusion using
an over-simplified method and that a thorough approach requires multivariate analysis).
193. Ayres's own work illuminates this assertion: Ayres conducted his survey in
response to the Mellman-Wirthlin Report to show that the public perceived BCRA's hard
money limits as synonymous with "large contributors" or "big contributors." Ayres, supra
note 192, at 274. Ayres's objective was to show that BCRA would do nothing to allay
public concerns about corruption in American politics. Id. at 276. Indeed, Ayres found
that 66% of Americans viewed BCRA's $25,000 per person annual contribution limit to
political parties as a "large" contribution and 79% viewed BCRA's $50,000 per married
couple annual contribution limit to political parties as a "large" contribution. Id. at 275.
Ayres also found that 71% of survey respondents believed that members of Congress
sometimes make voting decisions based on the wishes of what people who give $25,000
contributions to their political party want even if the majority of their district would
disagree with that vote. Id. These data suggest that our current laws do not go far enough
to allay concerns about the influence of wealthy contributors on policymaking.
2005] CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
politicians are influenced by large contributors and feelings of
political inequality and disempowerment. 194  However, even in the
absence of hard data, the argument for equality is supported by
political theory-the notion that individual autonomy and influence
in the political process is a value worth promoting.195
2. Political Science Theory and Research
Although voting is one avenue in which citizens may participate
in political life, the ability to influence the selection of viable
candidates is another important form of participation.9 6 As Professor
Overton summarizes, widespread political participation serves four
functions: it (1) exposes politicians to a diversity of viewpoints; (2)
creates a greater chance of citizen buy-in to government decisions; (3)
increases the likelihood that government resources and priorities will
reflect demand; and (4) furthers the "self-fulfillment and self-
definition of individual citizens who play a role in shaping decisions
that affect their lives."1
97
As discussed above, there is no existing data that provide
evidence for or against a relationship between citizens' views of the
campaign finance system and efficacy; however, there is ample
evidence demonstrating the connection between efficacy and political
participation.198 One study found that people with high levels of
194. Collecting and analyzing such data is, admittedly, very challenging. Researchers
face significant limitations in sources of data, as well as problems disentangling the
complex interrelationships among variables studied (for example, existing laws influence
whether candidates run for office and the competitiveness of elections which, in turn,
influence both how voters perceive their ability to influence government and the laws that
govern campaign finance). See Primo & Milyo, supra note 163 (June 2005 manuscript at
9-10 & n.l).
195. See Overton, supra note 40, at 91 (asserting that the existence of meaningful
choices is essential to individual autonomy, resulting in "self-affirmation").
196. See id. ("By discounting the importance of meaningful participation in
determining the viability of candidates, the antireformers compromise critical autonomy
values. An individual who cannot give large sums reaps fewer benefits of self-affirmation
and is less able to exercise control over her life and community."); see also John M.
DeFigueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591, 594 (2005)
(noting that "[i]f more citizens participate, the perception that the system is the property
of wealthy special interests will likely decrease, and ordinary citizens' engagement with the
political system generally will likely increase"); Overton, supra note 40, at 101 (listing
voting, financial and other support for candidates, campaigns, political parties or interest
groups, and public advocacy and protest as forms of political participation).
197. Overton, supra note 40, at 101-02.
198. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 163, at 141 n.18 (citing classic texts on this
issue); see also Box-Steffensmeier et al., supra note 163, at 96 tbl.5.3 (reporting a highly
significant and strong relationship between efficacy and voter turnout in the 2000
presidential election).
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external efficacy were 10.6% more likely to vote, 4.8% more likely to
try to influence how others vote, and 2.8% more likely to contribute
money to a candidate than those with low levels of external
efficacy.'99 If skepticism about the financing of campaigns depresses
overall interest in political participation, the functioning of
representative democracy is stymied.00  Thus, reducing the
perception that large contributors dominate the debate and crafting
laws to maximize the ability of citizens to influence the candidate
selection process could have important outcomes, both for the
citizens themselves and for the effective functioning of government.
3. Policymakers' Experiences
At the level of practical politics, policymakers themselves have
acknowledged the sense among average voters that their views count
little when stacked up against those of campaign contributors who
bankroll increasingly expensive campaigns.201 For example, as
Senator Max Baucus said on the Senate floor in 1998 during debate
over an earlier version of BCRA: "People are becoming more and
more cynical about government. People tell me they think that
Congress cares more about 'fat cat special interests in Washington'
than the concerns of middle class families like theirs. Or they tell me
the system is corrupt. '22 Similarly, Representative Asa Hutchinson
wrote to the Chairman of the Republican Party about citizens in his
district: "[A] concern of my constituents ... is that their influence in
199. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 163, at 145 (reporting on data collected
from 1952 to 1990).
200. See id. at 245-48. Rosenstone and Hansen argue that the broader the base of
citizens involved in politics, the greater the chance that political leaders will hear and
incorporate a diversity of information into their decisionmaking. Id. In contrast,
"democratic government provides few incentives for leaders to attend to the needs of
people who neither affect the achievement of their policy goals nor influence the
perpetuation of their tenure in office." Id. at 247. Thus, to the extent that campaign
finance laws either actually are or are perceived by "average" citizens to be dominated by
wealthy people, average citizens may be demobilized and their views not communicated to
political leaders. See also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003)
(citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000)) (recognizing that
negative perceptions of large donors' influence in the political system could depress voter
participation in "democratic governance").
201. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting members of
Congress discussing their constituents' views of the campaign finance system); McConnell
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 873 (D.D.C. 2003) (mem. op. of Leon, J.)
(same).
202. 144 CONG. REC. S1041 (1998) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
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politics is being diminished by the abuses of soft money. '2°3  The
sense illustrated by these examples gets at an underlying sense of
political inequality: average citizens feel that their views count less
than those of campaign contributors.2 °4
Additionally, after the McConnell Court upheld BCRA, Senator
McCain wrote that among the most significant aspects of the new
legislation was the law's restoration of "the American people's faith
that their government belongs to them, and not only to those who can
afford enormous payments to parties and candidates. '25  McCain
worried about the "skyrocketing cost of campaigns ... [which] causes
politicians to focus on large donors ... [and perpetuates] both the
appearance and reality that candidates are largely disengaged from
those citizens who can give only small amounts ... or nothing at
all. ' 2 6 Senator McCain thus tied together arguments about equality
and corruption, suggesting a rationale that the Court might find
compelling in reassessing Buckley's core holdings. His language and
that of other reformers can be read to articulate a compelling state
interest in promoting equality and "a general participatory self-
government objective.
'27
B. The Equality Concept in Legal Argument
Although framing the issue in terms of the "appearance of
corruption" rather than in terms of equality, McConnell
acknowledged the connection between large contributions and
barriers to equal participation.2 8 Recent lower court opinions have
recognized this connection as well. In 2005, Judge Calabresi,
concurring in the denial of a rehearing in Landell v. Sorrell,2°
explicitly addressed equality. t0 Judge Calabresi argued that the
203. Letter from Asa Hutchinson, U.S. Representative, to Jim Nicholson, Republican
National Commission Chairman (July 9, 1997), quoted in McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at
873 (mem. op. of Leon, J.).
204. To be sure, the role that money plays in the political system has long been
acknowledged by political elites. See William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the
First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 317 (2004) (quoting nineteenth century
industrialist and political power broker Marcus Hanna's famous statement: "'[T]here are
two things that are important in politics. The first is money and I can't remember what the
second one is.' ").
205. John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way Forward, 3 ELECTION L.J.
115, 115 (2004).
206. Id. at 120.
207. Breyer, supra note 27, at 252.
208. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 143-44 (2003).
209. Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir.) (Calabresi, J., concurring), cert.
granted sub nom., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005).
210. Id. at 162.
20051
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Buckley framework failed to acknowledge that the unequal
distribution of wealth necessarily constrains the ability of all citizens
to register their political support: "The notion that intensity of desire
[to support a candidate] is not well-measured by money in a society
where money is not equally distributed has been, since Buckley, the
huge elephant-and donkey-in the living room in all discussions of
campaign finance reform."21' Similarly, in 2003, a Ninth Circuit panel
wrote that an unregulated campaign finance environment "allows the
influence of wealthy individuals and corporations to drown out the
voices of individual citizens. '212 The panel argued that this inequality
has pernicious effects, "producing a political system unresponsive to
the needs and desires of the public, and causing the public to become
disillusioned with and mistrustful of the political system.
'213
Such calls to incorporate political equality as a compelling state
interest in campaign finance regulation are not new. As discussed in
Part I.A, using equality as a rationale for campaign finance reform
dates back, at least, to Congress's enactment of the 1974 amendments
to FECA. In the government's brief to the Supreme Court, the FEC
argued that Congress intended the cap on expenditures to "lessen the
disproportionate advantage, the distorting effect, of wealthy special
interest groups, and to increase opportunities for meaningful
participation by ordinary citizens, as voters, supporters and
candidates. '214 The Buckley Court, however, struck down the idea
that Congress could limit individual, non-coordinated, expenditures
in an effort to "equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the
outcome of elections. '215 The Court invoked the First Amendment as
incompatible with restrictions on both candidate and independent
expenditures:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... The First
Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of
free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a
person's financial ability to engage in public discussion.216
211. Id.
212. Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding an Alaska law
limiting soft money contributions).
213. Id.
214. Brief for the Attorney General and the FEC at 23, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (per curiam) (Nos. 75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 171459.
215. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
216. Id. at 48-49.
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The Court distinguished the constitutional requirement of equal
representation in voting and reapportionment from the prohibition
on legislatively-enforced equality in campaign financing, writing that
voting and political representation decisions give an equal right to
participate regardless of wealth, but that the same principle does not
extend to political speech.217  Significantly, this is the only
pronouncement from a majority of the Court on equality in the
campaign finance context and reflects a free market approach to the
concept of political debate.
218
Although the full Buckley Court rejected the equality rationale
as a permissible means of regulating campaign finance, the
importance of equality in politics has loomed in the background of
Supreme Court opinions on the issue. On the Buckley Court itself,
three Justices found the equality rationale compelling. 219  Most
powerfully, Justice White, dissenting from the Court's holding on the
impermissibility of expenditure caps, argued that campaign
expenditures do not always amount to speech or other expressive
conduct,220 and found unconvincing the Court's distinction between
the permissibility of capping contributions but not expenditures. 221
217. Id. at 49 n.55.
218. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 39, at 1161-62.
219. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECIiON LAW: JUDGING
INEQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 106-07 (2003) (discussing the
Court's consideration of the equality rationale and noting that three justices-Marshall,
White, and Brennan-were sympathetic, while five "utterly rejected" it). Hasen also
outlines the Court's continued hostility to the equality rationale in most of its post-
Buckley decisions and explains how the pro-equality Justices refined their defense of
equality in subsequent cases. Id. at 108-11.
220. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 263 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221. Id. at 261. In the years since Buckley, three lower court cases of note have
addressed expenditure caps. In Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir.) (Calabresi,
J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005), the Second
Circuit left open the possibility that Vermont's law limiting contributions to $400 or less
per candidate per election cycle and expenditure limits of $300,000 per gubernatorial
candidate per election cycle could be justified by a state interest in stemming public
cynicism and limiting candidate fundraising time. See Greenhouse, supra note 45.
In addition, federal appeals courts heard challenges to two municipal laws limiting
expenditures. See Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900, 902 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004); Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 909-10 (6th Cir.
1998). Although both cases ultimately held the caps to be unconstitutional under Buckley,
each sparked a judicial debate about the scope and durability of Buckley's holding. In
Kruse, the Sixth Circuit struck down as incompatible with Buckley the argument that the
city's interest in promoting equality justified a spending cap on Cincinnati city council
races. Kruse, 142 F.3d at 917-18. Although concurring in the judgment in the particular
case before the court, one member of the three judge panel argued that Buckley did not
create a per se constitutional bar on expenditure limits, concluding that "[i]t may be
possible to develop a factual record to establish that.., the interest in preserving faith in
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Justice White focused, in particular, on the public's democratic
interest in capping expenditures:
It is also important to restore and maintain public confidence in
federal elections. It is critical to obviate or dispel the
impression that federal elections are purely and simply a
function of money, that federal offices are bought and sold or
that political races are reserved for those who have the facility
... for doing whatever it takes to bring together those interests,
groups, and individuals that can raise or contribute large
fortunes in order to prevail at the polls.222
Beginning nearly fifteen years after Buckley, the Court issued a
series of opinions that created potential openings for a new
framework for assessing campaign finance regulations. A number of
the Court's opinions recognize that the unequal distribution of wealth
in society has undesirable ramifications in the political arena. In its
1990 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce223 decision, the Court
seemed to open the door slightly to the notion that some speakers-
in that case, corporation-backed advocacy groups-should not be
our democracy is compelling, and that campaign expenditure limits are a narrowly tailored
means of serving such an interest." Id. at 920.
In Homans, the district court initially upheld an expenditure cap on
Albuquerque's mayoral candidates against a plaintiff seeking an injunction on the
application of the law. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 160 F.Supp. 2d 1266, 1274 (D.
N.M. 2001), rev'd 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004). The district
court found that Buckley did not render expenditure limits per se unconstitutional, id. at
1272, and held that the expenditure caps withstood strict scrutiny, id. at 1273, based on the
government's compelling interest in "preserving faith in democracy." Id. at 1272. As its
justification, the court said, "[t]he record clearly establishes twenty-five years of
expenditure limits that have preserved the integrity of Albuquerque's electoral process
and the public's faith in its elections." Id. at 1273. Although the Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court and held that expenditure caps were per se unconstitutional except where
the government could demonstrate a compelling interest in addressing corruption, see
Homans, 366 F.3d at 916, Judge Lucero's concurrence left open the possibility for "a
system of campaign expenditure limits that would survive exacting scrutiny," id. at 907
(Lucero, J., concurring), and that "other compelling interests [besides corruption] may be
identified in future cases," id. at 911.
222. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 265 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). Austin is the only example of the Court upholding a limit on
expenditures by organizations not connected to a candidate or political party. See HASEN,
supra note 219, at 114. The idea that the influence of corporate wealth on elections might
be curtailed on the basis of the disparity between corporate money and public support for
the corporation's ideas first surfaced in dicta in a case involving a nonprofit corporation's
right to make expenditures from its general treasury funds. See Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258-59 (1986) (holding that a nonprofit corporation
organized to pursue ideological goals could make contributions from its treasury funds and
was not required to use a PAC because the costs involved in forming a PAC would
effectively stifle its speech).
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permitted to use their wealth to unduly influence public discourse.224
The Austin Court upheld a Michigan law that prohibited most
corporations from using general treasury funds to make independent
expenditures on behalf of a candidate in state elections. 25 There was
no allegation that corruption or the appearance of corruption either
motivated or justified the law; rather, the Court upheld the law based
on the notion that corporate wealth could distort the political
process.226 In an opinion authored by Justice Marshall, the Court
explained that "Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of
corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas.
227
Although the Court's decision in Austin was limited only to
independent expenditures made by corporations and was justified
largely by the Court's focus on the wealth-amassing advantages of the
corporate form, the decision spurred a wave of scholarship on the
idea of political equality as a justification for campaign finance
regulation. 28 In the wake of Austin, and a decade before McConnell,
notable scholars, practitioners, and "good government" advocates
debated the merits of equality as a rationale for regulation of the
financial aspects of the political system. A number of scholars
endorsed the notion of crafting campaign finance rules to further
political equality. 29 Constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein wrote,
224. Austin, 494 U.S. at 666.
225. Id. at 668-69.
226. See id. at 659.
227. Id. at 659-60. Professor Hasen calls the Court's focus on the importance of the
level of expenditures being equivalent to the level of public support the "barometer
equality rationale." HASEN, supra note 219, at 114.
228. See, e.g., Symposium, Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM L. REV. 1125 (1994)
(bringing together notable campaign finance scholars). But see Austin, 494 U.S. at 692-93
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia criticizes the equality rationale:
Perhaps the Michigan law before us here has an unqualifiedly noble objective-to
"equalize" the political debate by preventing disproportionate expression of
corporations' points of view .... The premise of our Bill of Rights, however, is
that there are some things ... that government cannot be trusted to do .... The
fundamental approach of the First Amendment, I had always thought, was to
assume the worst, and to rule the regulation of political speech "for fairness' sake"
simply out of bounds.
229. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1281, 1288-89 (1994); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 39, at 1165; Strauss, supra note
160, at 1370; Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1390,1400 (1994).
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"[i]nsofar as Buckley rejects political equality as a legitimate
constitutional goal, it should be overruled."230  David Strauss
diagnosed corruption and the appearance of corruption as symptoms
of underlying inequality and argued that, in order to alleviate these
symptoms, the inequality must be remedied.231 Most powerfully,
Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz argued that the government's
market-based approach to political campaigns-where money
speaks-should be supplanted by a focus on promoting the ability of
all citizens to participate equally in the nation's democratic polity:
The key First Amendment issue at stake in this debate is not
the right of the wealthy to spend up to the heavens, but the
right of all citizens, poor and wealthy alike, to speak and
participate meaningfully in the electoral process. Thus, a
campaign finance regime's compatibility with the First
Amendment will turn on the extent to which citizens are
enabled to ask questions of-and share their thoughts with-
candidates, to witness debates between candidates, and to help
fashion the public agenda through dialogue.232
More recently, although prior to McConnell, some of the individual
opinions in the Court's campaign finance decisions seem to have
moved the Court closer to adopting an equality233 or "democratic self-
230. Sunstein, supra note 229, at 1400. For an interesting, more pragmatic perspective,
see Blasi, supra note 229, at 1288-89 (suggesting four reasons that campaign expenditure
limits may be constitutionally justified by concerns about the quality of political
representation, and focusing on the decline in representation that occurs when politicians
spend disproportionate amounts of time talking to campaign contributors). Providing
support for this view, the Mellman-Wirthlin Report shows that seventy-one percent of
adults surveyed agreed with the statement that "Members of Congress spend so much
time raising large campaign contributions for their political party that it interferes with
their ability to do their jobs properly" and that, by a two-to-one margin, survey
respondents were more likely to think that fundraising interferes with members' job
performance than to think that it does not. MELLMAN-WIRTHLIN REPORT, supra note
175, at 16-17.
231. See Strauss, supra note 160, at 1370 (arguing that concern about corruption is
really a concern about "inequality and the dangers of interest group politics").
232. Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 39, at 1165. But see SMITH, supra note 159, at 211
(disputing the validity of regulation aimed at equalizing debate).
233. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 219, at 114-16; Victoria A. Farrar-Myers, Campaign
Finance: Reform, Representation, and the First Amendment, in LAW AND ELECTION
POLITICS, supra note 110, at 43, 54. In a separate work, Professor Hasen focuses
particularly on three pre-McConnell cases that, in combination with McConnell, he argues,
point toward an participatory self-government or equality rationale: Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), upholding a Missouri law limiting
candidate contributions; Colorado Federal Republican Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431 (2001), upholding a maximum
coordinated expenditure law for political parties on the grounds that coordinated
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government '234 rationale. The tenor of these separate opinions
reflects the idea that providing all citizens an opportunity to
participate equally may be tantamount to safeguarding positive First
Amendment rights.235 For example, in 1996, when the Court struck
down limitations on the amount of money a political party could
spend independently of its candidate, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
dissented, arguing that:
[Tihe Government has an important interest in leveling the
electoral playing field .... It is quite wrong to assume that the
net effect of limits on contributions and expenditures-which
tend to protect equal access to the political arena ... will be
adverse to the interest in informed debate protected by the
First Amendment.
236
Justice Breyer, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PA C,
237
articulated the view that First Amendment concerns are implicated
not only by restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures,
but also by the democratizing influence that campaign finance
regulations have on the political process:
[C]onstitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the
legal equation .... [A] decision to contribute money to a
campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern .... On the
other hand, restrictions ... protect the integrity of the electoral
process-the means through which a free society
democratically translates political speech into concrete
governmental action. 38
Justice Breyer elaborated on this view in a 2002 speech. Reiterating
his reasoning in Shrink Missouri, he explained, "campaign finance
laws, despite the limits they impose, help to further the kind of open
public political discussion that the First Amendment also seeks to
encourage, not simply as an end, but also as a means to achieve a
expenditures are equivalent to a contribution to the party's candidate; and Federal
Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), holding that Congress can limit
contributions made by nonprofit, ideological corporations. Hasen, supra note 37, at 42-46.
234. See Breyer, supra note 27, at 253.
235. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 112, at 150-51 (noting three subtle differences between
the self-government and equality rationales).
236. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 649-50 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
238. Id. at 400-01 (Breyer, J., concurring). This language was adopted by the
McConnell Court. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003).
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workable democracy. 2 39  In hindsight, Justice Breyer's remarks
anticipate the specific issue raised by the vast contributions in the
2004 elections and shed light on the connection between money in
politics and political inequality. Justice Breyer noted that "too few
individuals contribute too much money" with the "end result ... a
marked inequality of participation. '24 °
Most recently, in McConnell, the Court hinted that the
government interest in promoting a healthy participatory democracy
might warrant greater regulation in the area of campaign finance241
and signaled its deference to Congress in determining appropriate
solutions.242 Professor Hasen characterizes the McConnell Court's
decision as "tak[ing] pains to show ... fidelity to Buckley, tripping
over itself to apply the corruption (as anti-circumvention) rationale
.... However, a more natural reading ... is as a sub silentio
acceptance of the participatory self-government rationale. '243
Professor Farrar-Myers agrees, arguing that the Court implicitly
accepted the impact on democracy that large contributions have or
appear to the public to have: "The Stevens/O'Connor [majority]
opinion moves beyond the quid pro quo concerns raised in Buckley to
incorporate the conception of representation-as-equality as a
judicially accepted basis for campaign finance regulations." '244
The McConnell Court prefaced its opinion by quoting the early
twentieth century Nobel Prize winner Elihu Root's advocacy of
legislation that curtailed the influence of special interests in
government. 245 The majority opinion cited Root's view that campaign
finance reform would " 'strik[e] at a constantly growing evil which has
done more to shake the confidence of plain people of small means ...
than any other [government] practice.' ,246 The McConnell Court also
239. Breyer, supra note 27, at 253.
240. Id. at 251-52.
241. See infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at
136-37 (explaining that contribution limits directly affect the integrity of the electoral
process, the role of citizens within the electoral process, and "tangibly benefit public
participation in political debate").
242. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223-24 ("Many years ago we observed that '[t]o say that
Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard ... an election from
the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny the nation in a vital particular
the power of self protection.' " (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545
(1934))).
243. Hasen, supra note 37, at 57-58.
244. Farrar-Myers, supra note 233, at 54.
245. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 (citing ELIHu ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT
AND CITIZENSHIP 143 (Bacon & Scott ed. 1916)).
246. Id. (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567,571 (1957)).
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adopted Justice Breyer's Shrink Missouri language about the
importance of the electoral process in democracy.247 Additionally, in
upholding the ban on corporate and union electioneering
communications, the Court wrote that its decision was justified by
" 'preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing
corruption, and 'sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the
individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the
government.' "2 Finally, while perhaps questionable evidence of the
Court's movement toward equality, Professor Hasen points to the fact
that the Court "accurately recounts the Buckley holding but pointedly
fails to recount Buckley's explicit rejection of the equality rationale as
a justification for expenditure limits."249 Hasen also notes that the
Court has never explicitly responded to Justice Breyer's assertion in
Shrink Missouri that the Buckley Court's rejection of the equality
rationale "cannot be taken literally.""0 Professor Hasen believes that
this textual reading is as an indication of the Court's willingness to
reconsider equality251 and sees the "ultimate question about the
direction of the post-2000 jurisprudence ... [as] whether it may lead
the Supreme Court to uphold expenditure limits outside the corporate
and union context.
252
247. Id. at 137 ("[T]he electoral process is the very 'means through which a free society
democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action .... ")
(quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
248. Id. at 206 n.88 (emphasis added) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978)).
249. Professor Hasen sees this omission as more significant, writing that "[i]t seems as
probable as not that the Court's elisional history was intentional and not inadvertent."
Hasen, supra note 37, at 60.
250. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring);
see Hasen, supra note 37, at 60 (discussing Justice Breyer's rejection of the Buckley
assertion "that government may [not] restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
48-49 (1976) (per curiam))).
251. See Hasen, supra note 37, at 60.
252. Id. at 67 (suggesting that caps on independent expenditures used to fund
electioneering communications may flow from McConnell). But see Election Law:
Breaking News: Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Two Campaign Finance Cases (Sept. 27,
2005), www.electionlawblog.org/archives/004069.html. Reflecting on the changes in the
Court's composition with the appointment of John Roberts as Chief Justice and the
impending resignation of Justice O'Connor, Professor Hasen explains he is less optimistic
about the Court's amenability to expenditure caps. Id. ("Since the 1976 Buckley case, the
Court's cases have swung back and forth like a pendulum, in recent years in favor of
upholding campaign finance regulations. We could well be entering the period where the
pendulum swings back.").
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C. Roadblocks to Recognizing Equality
Even if policymakers were to accept the premise of equality-
oriented reform as beneficial for encouraging "participatory self-
government," there are significant barriers to recognizing equality as
a goal in crafting and upholding campaign finance regulations. The
three most challenging of these obstacles will be discussed in turn.
This Comment does not propose workable solutions to each of these
barriers or a comprehensive strategy to persuade Congress to pass
and the Court to uphold equality-based reforms. This Comment does
seek, however, to spark additional debate about equality as a value
worth pursuing.253
1. Constitutional Barriers
The primary barrier to a shift in the Court's campaign finance
jurisprudence would, of course, be the Court's prior interpretation of
the First Amendment, equating a political donor's money with
political speech, 4 and finding that only the government's interest in
preventing corruption justifies regulation.255 The corruption issue has
been addressed above in Part III.B. As to the Court's equation of
money with speech, this premise has come into question from
members of the Court. For example, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 6 Justice Stevens wrote in his concurrence,
253. Accord Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir.) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
("[T]he sort of conversation taking place ... would be a far more fruitful one-from the
standpoints both of campaign finance policy and constitutional jurisprudence-were it
able to be brought out from under Buckley's corruption mantle and into a framework that
more honestly reflects the issues at play."), cert. granted sub nom., Randall v. Sorrell, 126
S. Ct. 35 (2005).
254. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
255. See supra Part I.A. Accord Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900, 916
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004) (interpreting Buckley as mandating that only
the state's compelling interest in preventing corruption would justify expenditure caps).
An additional potential barrier is the Court's unwillingness to consider equal protection
challenges to campaign finance laws. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S.
93, 226-27 (2003) (denying standing to plaintiffs challenging BCRA's increase in hard
money contribution limits and stating that "the plaintiffs allege a curtailment of the scope
of their participation in the electoral process. But we have noted that '[p]olitical 'free
trade' does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do
so with exactly equal resources.' " (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986))). Given the Court's rejection of economic status as a
suspect class for equal protection purposes outside of the criminal law and voting rights
contexts, see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-25 (1973), this
Comment assumes that equal protection challenges to campaign finance laws are
untenable.
256. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
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"Money is property; it is not speech. '25 7  In the same case, Justice
Breyer also expressed skepticism about the equivalence of money and
speech, writing that "a decision to contribute money to a campaign is
a matter of First Amendment concern-not because money is speech
(it is not); but because it enables speech. '258  Fifteen years before
Shrink Missouri, Justice White articulated the same concern, arguing:
"The First Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to
spend .... [T]he expenditures in this case ... produce [First
Amendment] speech; they are not speech itself."259
Further, the Court's practice of subjecting restrictions on
expenditures to strict scrutiny constrains permissible avenues of
regulation.26  However, were the Court to decide that money and
speech are not synonymous, the Court would be free to abandon its
distinction between the lesser scrutiny that contribution limits receive
and the heightened scrutiny to which expenditures limits are
subjected. 26 ' The Court could then adopt a uniform standard of lesser
scrutiny, requiring only a "sufficiently important state interest" and a
"closely drawn" regulation.262 This Comment does not suggest that
the Court defer unthinkingly to Congress on matters where
congressional actors could clearly have self-interested motives, as
incumbent politicians do when crafting campaign finance laws.
Nevertheless, the application of strict scrutiny to areas where it is
nearly impossible to prove a compelling state interest frustrates
efforts at beneficial reforms. The Court undoubtedly has the capacity
to assess policymakers' motivation for regulation critically while at
the same time considering whether any given reform will further
democratic participatory interests.
257. Id. at 377 (Stevens, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
259. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 508 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting).
260. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (per curiam). Indeed, some members of
the Court have called on their colleagues to subject both contribution and expenditure
restrictions to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Colorado H, 533 U.S. 431, 465-66 (2001) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Buckley should be overruled because of its failure to protect
First Amendment speech and association rights); Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 406 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's adherence to stare decisis is misplaced,
"perpetuat[ing] and compound[ing] a serious distortion of the First Amendment resulting
from our own intervention in Buckley").
261. See supra note 63 (explaining that restrictions on contributions must be closely
drawn to match a sufficiently important state interest while expenditure limits must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
262. See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 387-88 (discussing standards of review).
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2. The "Media Exception" as Detrimental to Equality
At its core, the argument in favor of equality-oriented reform is
rooted in the notion of faith in government: that giving ordinary
individuals a more equal playing field for influencing the political
debate will enhance efficacy and increase involvement by positively
influencing citizens' faith in the political process. Although critics of
the equality rationale question even the basic premise that regulation
can lead to a more vibrant democracy, 263 both critics and supporters
of equality-based reform recognize a central flaw. Equality-oriented
reform is hindered by the media exception,26 a critical inequity built
into the existing campaign finance scheme that would only be
exacerbated by further restrictions on citizens, candidates, and
interest groups. 65
Under current law, media organizations are exempted from all of
the laws and regulations that apply to expenditures made by other
corporations, 266 so that "any news story, commentary, or editorial
distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station,
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication" are not
considered "expenditures" made on behalf of a candidate and are not
regulated by FECA.26 7 Thus, the resources that a news organization
263. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 159, at 226-27.
264. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2000).
265. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch
Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1629 & n.18 (1999) (citing multiple campaign finance
scholars who have commented on the media exception problem and characterizing their
argument as follows: "that equality cannot be achieved when the media are given an even
more preeminent place than they already have in the shaping of public attitudes toward
federal candidates"). Anti-regulation scholars have long argued that any restrictions on
campaign spending and contribution limits increase the influence of the media. See Smith,
supra note 155, at 1078-79; see also Danny J. Boggs, Introduction: Campaign Finance and
Media Influence, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 6 (2000) (noting both the absence of
scholarship on the regulation of the media within the campaign finance regulatory
framework and the importance of the news media in election campaigns).
266. In general, corporations and labor unions cannot make contributions to
candidates or expenditures on behalf of candidates from their general treasury funds, see 2
U.S.C. § 441b (2000), and must instead set up a corporate or union PAC to make
contributions to or expenditures on behalf of candidates, see id. § 441b(b)(2)(C).
Additionally, as amended by BCRA sections 201 and 204, corporations and labor unions
are also prohibited from making "electioneering communications," broadcast
advertisements that refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office within thirty
days of a primary election or sixty days before a general election. See id. § 441(f)(3)(A)(i)
(2000 & Supp. 2002) (defining electioneering communication); id. § 441b(b)(2) (including
electioneering communications in the list of expenditures prohibited by corporations).
267. See id. § 431(9)(B)(i) (excluding the efforts of media corporations from FECA's
definition of "expenditure" generally); id. § 441(f)(3)(B) (excluding news stories,
commentaries, and editorials produced or run by a broadcast station from the definition of
"electioneering communication"). The exemption does not apply to media outlets that
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expends on political coverage, commentary, and endorsements are
not considered contributions to a candidate's campaign,268 regardless
of the news outlet's motivation for the particular coverage.269
Scholars who question the rationale for the media exception
have documented the changing nature of the media27 ° as a basis for
arguing that media corporations should be required to pay for
endorsements of candidates from a separate corporate PAC.271 In an
era where media organizations are owned by a handful of
corporations, 272 some scholars argue that the media exception creates
a clear barrier to equality2 73 that would only be exacerbated by
further limitations on individual, organizational, and candidate
spending. 4 Professor Hasen explains that limiting the participation
of individuals and corporations but failing to regulate the quantity
and visibility of the media's political coverage gives the media a
are owned or controlled by a political party, political committee or candidate. Id.
§ 431(9)(B)(i). The FEC is currently considering whether Internet communications,
particularly Internet sites run or owned by corporate or labor union entities whose
primary business does not include "journalism," fall within the media exception. See
generally Federal Election Commission, Public Hearing on Internet Communications
(June 29, 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/internetcomm/20050629
transcript-rev.doc (providing views of reformers, bloggers, and others on regulation of the
Internet under FECA).
268. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 455
(2002) (noting that, through their media organization subsidiaries, some corporations are
allowed to influence political campaigns in ways that other corporations cannot).
269. See Hasen, supra note 265, at 1639-44 (examining media corporations'
motivations for endorsing particular candidates or providing favorable coverage;
presenting evidence, including media corporations' PAC contributions and pro-incumbent
endorsement decisions, to support the theory that media corporations use their coverage
to obtain access to policymakers).
270. See Anderson, supra note 268, at 455 (noting that the media has become more
corporate since 1990, when the Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce Court
recognized the special status of news media organizations).
271. See Hasen, supra note 265, at 1663.
272. See BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 27 (2004) (calculating that
five dominant corporations controlled the United States mass media in 2003, down from
fifty such corporations in 1983). The five dominant corporations Bagdikian identifies are:
Time Warner, The Walt Disney Company, Rupert Murdoch's News Corp, Viacom, and
the German corporation Bertelsmann. Id. at 3. Each of these corporations owns a variety
of media outlets, including newspapers, magazines, book publishers, radio stations, and
television stations. Id.
273. See Hasen, supra note 265, at 1629 & n.18 (citing anti-reformer scholars, such as
Arthur Eisenberg and Joel Gora, who recognize the inequalities inherent in the media
exception, but argue that the problem requires less regulation of other actors); see also
Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1252 (1994) (treating newspapers and other media
enterprises the same as other entities in a hypothetical, equality-oriented reform scheme).
274. See Smith, supra note 155, at 1078-79 (arguing that any restrictions on
contributions and expenditures increase the influence of the media).
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greater chance than other individual and organizational actors to
influence the outcome of elections and secure access to politicians;275
further, he argues, leaving the media as the only unregulated player in
political campaigns could create the perception that the media hold a
higher status than other actors in influencing election outcomes.276
Thus, efforts to perpetuate equality in order to increase political
engagement and efficacy could be stymied by the persistence of the
media exception.
277
Although it is possible that the media exception is not
constitutionally-compelled,278  the plain language of the First
Amendment cautions against restraints on the media's ability to
publish or air news stories, commentaries, or editorials that mention
or endorse federal candidates. 279  Additionally, when upholding the
media exception against an equal protection challenge, the Supreme
Court noted the press's "unique role" in providing information to the
public.28°  Even if the Supreme Court were willing to sanction a
congressional decision to repeal the media exception in the name of
equality,28' it is not at all clear that regulating the media is
275. See Hasen, supra note 265, at 1646.
276. Id.
277. Id. (concluding that the resulting real or perceived inequality could have political
consequences because, "when individuals even incorrectly believe that they have little or
no political power, their beliefs may lead them to discontinue political action").
278. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990) (upholding
the permissibility of the media exception, but noting that, although the State had a
compelling reason for excluding media corporations from FECA's expenditure limits, "the
press's unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection under the
Constitution" (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 & n.18
(1978))) (emphasis added); Hasen, supra note 265, at 1656-57 (arguing that although it is
unlikely that the Court would find regulation of media activity to be constitutional, the
question is "an open one").
279. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press .... ").
280. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 667-68 (finding that "a valid distinction exists between
corporations that are part of the media industry and other corporations that are not
involved in the regular business of imparting news to the public"); see also McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 208-09 (2003) (reaffirming the permissibility of the
media exception and dismissing the notion that the prohibition on electioneering
communications by non-media corporations unconstitutionally discriminates in favor of
media corporations). But see Anderson, supra note 268, at 455 (calling the Austin Court's
distinction in 1990 between media corporations and other corporations "extremely
dubious" in 2002, given media conglomeration); supra note 278 and accompanying text.
281. See Hasen, supra note 265, at 1657 (arguing that a repeal of the media exception
would have a better chance of surviving constitutional review if the Supreme Court were
to overrule Buckley's refusal to recognize equality as a compelling justification for
campaign finance regulations).
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normatively desirable, 282 even to those who otherwise advocate for
greater campaign finance regulation.283  Nonetheless, Professor
Hasen's work serves as a warning that either reformers must find
creative strategies to neutralize the presence of the media exception
in a pro-equality reform scheme214 or the goals of equality-oriented
reform risk frustration.
3. Congressional Aversion to Heightened Regulation
Although the primary focus of this Comment is the theoretical
justification, legal framework, and practical need for equality-
oriented reform, it is worth considering briefly the political aspects
of-and barriers to-heightened campaign finance regulation. The
most recent legislative actions relating to campaign finance reform
suggest that any effort to enact more restrictive campaign finance
regulations has low odds of success in Congress. As discussed in the
Introduction and in Part II, during and in the immediate aftermath of
the 2004 elections, policymakers focused solely on regulating 527s.
During the election cycle, the FEC considered and then declined to
implement rules to regulate 527s under FECA.285 In response,
members of Congress in both 2004 and early 2005 introduced the 527
Reform Act to explicitly regulate 527s by bringing 527 organizations
282. Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. Valeo: A Landmark of Political Freedom, 33 AKRON L.
REV. 7, 27 n.44 (1999) ("Normal First Amendment instincts are fundamentally averse to
such government micro management of media and politics.").
283. See, e.g., Overton, supra note 149, at 1034 (distinguishing regulation of campaign
finance generally from regulation of the media, based on the media's "important role in
democracy" by "imparting news and opinion to the public," providing a "forum for the
perspectives of various individuals," and "expos[ing] and check[ing] government abuses").
284. The Internet is a significant wild-card in this debate. Some suggest that applying
the media exception broadly to all web sites and weblogs ("blogs") that are not affiliated
with a political party, partisan organization, or candidate would create a new venue for the
unregulated airing of diverse views. See, e.g., Christopher P. Zubowicz, The New Press
Corps: Applying the Federal Election Campaign Act's Press Exemption to Online Political
Speech, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6 83-86 (2004), http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue2/v9i2_a06-
Zubowicz.pdf. However, others express concern that granting the media exception to
blogs and websites could allow corporations, unions, and partisan groups to circumvent
the rules. For postings on this subject at the Election Law Listserv, see, for example,
Posting of Larry Noble, inoble@crp.org, to election-law@majordomo.lls.edu (Oct. 7,
2005), http://majordomo.lls.edu/cgi-bin/lwgate/ELECTION-LAWGL/archives/election-
law.gl .archive.0510/subject/article-34.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Posting of Paul Ryan, PRyan@campaignlegalcenter.org, to election-law@majordomo
.lls.edu (Oct. 7, 2005), http://majordomo.lls.edu/cgi-bin/lwgate/ELECTION-LAWGL/
archives/election-law__gl.archive.0510/subject/article-40.html (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
285. See supra note 5 (detailing the FEC's consideration of 527 regulation).
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active during federal election cycles within FECA.2 86 The bill initially
enjoyed support even from lawmakers who had opposed BCRA.2
Although Congress-watchers originally predicted that the 527
Reform Act was likely to be "a fast-track issue, '288 by mid-2005, the
coalition that had formed around the 527 Reform Act splintered.289
Each congressional chamber expanded its focus to consider changing
existing hard money limits under FECA. By July 2005, the Senate
had coupled 527 regulation with a provision that would make it easier
for a congressional member's leadership PAC to contribute unlimited
sums of money to political party committees.90 Ultimately, by
286. See supra note 21 (detailing the initial introduction of the 527 Reform Act of
2005).
287. See Suzanne Nelson, Bill on 527s May Be on Fast Track, ROLL CALL, Feb. 3, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 149159 (citing former Senate Rules and Administration
Committee Chairman Trent Lott's conversion to support campaign finance reform); see
also Amy Keller, 527s Prepare Their Defense, ROLL CALL, Feb. 22, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 2721445 (citing House Administration Committee Chairman Bob Ney's support).
288. See Nelson, supra note 287.
289. Eliza Newlin Carney, Payback Time for '527' Groups, 37 NAT'L J. 2207, 2208 (July
9, 2005) (explaining that, in April 2005, Senator Charles Schumer, a co-sponsor of the
original 527 Reform Act, withdrew his support after a substitute bill had been introduced
and objectionable amendments attached to it).
290. See Suzanne Nelson & Paul Kane, Provision Splits Frist, McCain, ROLL CALL,
Aug. 8, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 12456653; see also Editorial, Campaign Funds
Mischief, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2005, at A32 (explaining that, by lifting the current
$15,000 annual cap on the amount that an incumbent's leadership PAC can transfer to the
candidate's national political party committee, incumbents can circumvent existing
restrictions on how leadership PAC money is spent). Leadership PACs, like all PACs
established by candidates, are currently only permitted to transfer $15,000 to their
affiliated national political party each year. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp.
2002). A leadership PAC can only be established by a federal lawmaker (i.e., a House or
Senate incumbent) and the money contributed to these PACs cannot be used to pay
directly for that lawmaker's campaign expenses; rather, the funds are used to support the
lawmaker's travel and as a means by which the lawmaker can contribute to his or her
colleagues' campaigns. See Nelson & Kane, supra. Supporters say the new provision
would help level the playing field within the political party structure between incumbents
with competitive races and those without meaningful opposition by giving the former the
ability to help his or her national party organization without sacrificing personal campaign
funds. See id. However, critics say that if leadership PACs are allowed to transfer
unlimited funds to the national party committees, candidates will be able to solicit funds
from the same donors for both their personal campaign committees and their leadership
PACs; leadership PAC funds would then be transferred to the national party with the tacit
understanding that these funds will be used to help the lawmaker's reelection. See id.
Along with the provision in section 3 of the 527 Fairness Act which allows unlimited
spending by a political party in coordination with a candidate's campaign, the ability to
transfer unlimited sums from leadership PACs to party organizations would be an easy
way to circumvent the hard money limits on the amount that an individual contributor can
give to a candidate's campaign. See Editorial, supra (explaining that, under the identical
provision in the Senate bill, instead of being limited to raising $2,100 from each donor per
election, lawmakers could have their supporters give $5,000 more and concluding that
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October, the Senate's efforts to pass both 527 reform and leadership
PAC deregulation looked unlikely.2 91 In the House, introduction of
the expansive 527 Fairness Act2 diverted Congress's focus from the
narrow 527 Reform Act. 293 The 527 Fairness Act would bring most
527s within FECA 294 but would also abolish the aggregate limit on
contributions that an individual can make to all political party
organizations, candidates, and PACs in an election cycle;295 permit
fund transfers between federal officeholders' leadership PACs and
national party committees;296 and repeal BCRA's limitations on
coordination between federal candidates and national political
parties.297 In short, rather than restricting the flow of money into
campaigns, the most recent proposals reflect a willingness on the part
of some lawmakers to increase the amount of money in politics. 98
Even if the current legislation fails, the evolution of the debate in
Congress shows that the momentum that might have catalyzed into
"[t]his ill-advised provision would increase the influence of deep-pocketed donors, make
incumbents even less vulnerable and set a dangerous precedent for making fundamental
changes in campaign finance law").
291. See Suzanne Nelson, Senate Abandons Provision on Leadership PAC, ROLL
CALL, Oct. 19, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 16925020.
292. See 527 Fairness Act, H.R. 1316, 109th Cong. (2005).
293. See Carney, supra note 289 (positing that both bills could come to the House floor
and noting that, in the wake of the 2004 elections, supporters of 527 regulation "did not
expect to be scrambling just to preserve existing rules").
294. See H.R. 1316 § 9.
295. See id. § 2. Under current law, $101,400 is the maximum that an individual is
permitted to give to all FECA-regulated entities during a two-year election cycle. See
H.R. REP. No. 109-146, at 13-14 (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong__reports&docid=f:hr146.109.pdf. The House Committee
considering the legislation explained that the abolition of the aggregate limits was
intended to stimulate contributions to political parties and PACs and remove incentives
for contributions to "outside groups." Id. at 14.
296. See H.R. 1316 § 6. This provision mirrors the amendment to the Senate
appropriations bill discussed supra at note 290. This legislation would, for the first time,
codify the term "leadership PAC." See Nelson, supra note 291.
297. See H.R. 1316 § 3.
298. One of the House bill's sponsors, Representative Mike Pence, explained his
legislation as "restoring basic fairness to the political parties and outside organizations
instead of attempting further regulation .... [W]hen it comes to political speech, greater
government control is never the answer. More freedom is." 151 CONG. REC. H2556
(daily ed. Apr. 27, 2005) (statement of Rep. Pence). Assessing the impact of the 527
Fairness Act, the Washington Post reported that "[u]nder the bill, one donor could direct
as much as $1 million in support of a candidate for federal office." See Thomas B. Edsall,
GOP Pushes Bill Easing Election Spending Limits, WASH. POST, June 9, 2005, at A8; see
also Carney, supra note 289 (reporting that the impact of abolishing the aggregate
contribution limit would allow one donor to give as much as $1 million to a political party
by donating to multiple party committees and as much as $2 million to federal candidates
by spreading donations over a wide group of candidates).
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pro-equality reforms after the 2004 election cycle has now dissipated.
Thus, a central practical barrier to implementing reforms premised on
remedying inequality is the lack of congressional will to effect such
changes at the national level. Perhaps, if the Court were to
reconsider Buckley, congressional interest in previously untenable
reforms would emerge-expenditure limits on individual campaigns,
political parties, and PACs are obvious candidates in this category.
Or, as some commentators have suggested, if and when the Court
revisits Buckley, perhaps state legislatures will provide the most
promising laboratories for reform at both the state299 and federal
levels.3°°
IV. A BRIEF ROADMAP FOR EQUALITY-ORIENTED REFORM
Were Congress and the Court to embrace equality as a
government interest worthy of protecting in campaign finance
regulations, numerous possibilities for reform would exist,
particularly with respect to regulating federal congressional elections
and state and local elections. General and specific proposals have
received extensive treatment elsewhere" 1 and need not be repeated in
detail here. Rather, this Part seeks to articulate the broad outlines of
a multi-pronged strategy for reform premised on the importance of
equality. This Comment asserts that the best approach is to curtail
the raising and spending of campaign funds by every player in the
system, including wealthy individuals, to allow all voices to be heard
299. States have long shown interest in reform, as evidenced by much of the campaign
finance litigation in the post-Buckley era. See generally Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding Missouri state candidate contribution limit); Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding state law limiting
corporation-backed advocacy group expenditures); Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159 (2d
Cir.) (denying motion to reconsider en banc the court's earlier decision striking down
Vermont's expenditure caps), cert. granted sub nom., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 35
(2005); Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir.) (ruling unconstitutional
Albuquerque's expenditure limits for mayoral candidates), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 625
(2004); Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting Cincinnati's
expenditure limits in city council election contests). For comprehensive information on
campaign finance laws in the fifty states, see National Conference of State Legislatures,
Campaign Finance, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/campfin.htm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2005).
300. For an intriguing argument that each individual state should control the campaign
finance laws that apply to that state's federal lawmakers, see William P. Marshall, The
Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 335, 376-86 (2000).
301. See, e.g., sources cited infra at notes 306, 313, 314, 316, 323, 324 (summarizing a
range of proposals that address contribution limits, expenditure limits, various types of




and responded to equally as a means of bolstering efficacy and
enthusiasm about the value of political participation.3°2  While
recognizing the danger that regulation may lead to the unintended
consequence of elevating the importance of elite political operatives
and the media,3 °3 this Comment contends that the focus of reform
should nonetheless be on crafting restrictions that level the playing
field among candidates and interest groups; otherwise, average
citizens will continue to be discouraged from participating because of
their real or perceived inability to compete in the marketplace of
political discourse. Regulations should offer attractive incentives to
"protect the integrity of the electoral process"3" and promote the
"open political discussion that the First Amendment also seeks to
encourage, not simply as an end, but also as a means to achieve a
workable democracy."3 5 The end of this Part cautions against the
pitfalls likely to befall reform efforts.
Any system of campaign finance seeking to maximize citizen
equality would require a multifaceted balancing of regulations that
address: contributions to candidates, parties, PACs, and independent
groups; expenditures by candidates and other players; and incentives
for candidates and citizens to engage in dialogue among and between
themselves. First, reformers could seek to reduce the maximum
allowable contributions to candidates, parties, PACs, and
independent groups to neutralize the impact that citizens' wealth
plays in their ability to participate in the financing of elections.3" In
302. The public may respond to the framing of the issue in terms of equality, as well. A
recent study concluded that, as between a framing of campaign finance that focuses on
"reduc[ing] the role of money in politics" and a framing that focuses on "giv[ing] everyone
an equal voice in politics," the equality framing was more salient. See GRANT &
RUDOLPH, supra note 156, at 102 tbl.6.2.
303. See SMITH, supra note 159, at 206.
304. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 400-01 (Breyer, J., concurring). But see id. at 397
(implying that a contribution limit that is so low that it is "so radical in effect as to render
political association ineffective" or "drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level
of notice" would pose a constitutional problem).
305. Breyer, supra note 27, at 253.
306. See Overton, supra note 40, at 77 ("Massive disparities in the distribution of
wealth cause disparities in political participation. The donor class effectively selects which
candidates will be viable through large hard money contributions."). One intriguing
proposal that has been advanced and would complement lower contribution limits is the
provision of tax credits to individuals wishing to donate to political campaigns. See id. at
107-08 (proposing both a $100 annual tax credit per individual for contributions to
political campaigns and a four-to-one match from public funds for contributions of $100 or
less, the combination of which would make an individual's $100 contribution worth $500 to
the recipient candidate, political party, or political organization); see also DeFigueiredo &
Garrett, supra note 196, at 595-96 (proposing a $100 annual tax credit per individual for
donations to federal candidates and national political parties).
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addition to promoting citizens' sense of efficacy, lower contribution
limits would also force candidates, parties, and interest groups to
interact with more people. As to candidates, lower contribution
limits would potentially increase exposure to a broader cross-section
of the population and could positively affect policymaking.3 7
Although the justification for capping contributions to independent
groups, including PACs and 527s, has a less direct effect on
policymaking, it could have an equally important impact on efficacy-
perhaps voters would come to see these organizations as more
representative of their interests if they felt that their small
contribution had the same chance as any other person's contribution
to impact the organization's policy priorities and agenda.3 °8
Second, if contribution limits are reduced, the imposition of
expenditure limits on candidates, campaigns, and both candidate-
affiliated and independent political organizations is essential to
promoting equality.3 9 If contributions were limited but expenditures
were left unchecked, there would be more pressure on candidates to
spend their time raising money rather than engaging with their
opponents and citizens on policy questions. The never-ending
pressure to raise money is a primary deficiency of the current
system-a deficiency that some commentators have already suggested
might warrant expenditure limits3 °--and would only become worse if
each candidate or organization could extract just a small amount of
money from each donor. By capping expenditures, there would come
a point when candidates or organizations could do no more
fundraising and would be forced to shift their focus to delivering their
message by interacting with voters.311  Capping independent
expenditures would prevent circumvention of limits on candidates
307. See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 163, at 247.
308. See MELLMAN-WIRTHLIN REPORT, supra note 175, at 33 q.19C (revealing
ambivalence about whether citizens feel that interest groups in Washington, D.C.
represent their views).
309. This pairing of contribution limits and expenditure caps is precisely what Congress
enacted in 1974. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 229, at 1288-89 (citing politicians' focus on fundraising
as a justification for capping expenditures); see also Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d
907, 919 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1998) (Cohn, J., concurring) (articulating a government interest in
"freeing officeholders from the pressures of fundraising so they can perform their duties").
311. Although public opinion is not synonymous with good public policy, it is worth
noting that capping candidate expenditures is popular among citizens. A post-election
survey conducted in 2002 revealed that, among ten potential reforms, a proposal to cap
expenditures was the most popular: 85% agreed that congressional candidates' campaign
spending should be limited. See Box-Steffensmeier et al., supra note 163, at 85, 90-91 &
n.1 (reporting results from a survey of 1,229 adult respondents).
[Vol. 84
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
and parties by using 527s as surrogates for the political party
structure.
Third, together with campaign and expenditure limitations,
campaign regulations should seek to encourage interactions between
candidates and other players in the political system and voters. If
fundraising becomes less important and average citizens appreciate its
reduced importance,312 perhaps voters will come to place greater
value on their own role in shaping their representatives' priorities.
Creating incentives and mechanisms for citizens to hear directly from
and interact with elected leaders and candidates seeking office
becomes essential to this exchange. Advocates of reform have
suggested that giving incentives to broadcasters to provide free or
inexpensive airtime to candidates and interest groups,313 incentives for
candidates to communicate directly with voters at town-hall style
meetings, and incentives for voters to communicate directly with one
another314 would help to promote more egalitarian democratic
discourse. In order to avoid an elitist bias in fora for such exchanges
and maximizing broad participation, it would be important for
candidates, parties, and political organizations to seek out
opportunities that would allow interactions with voters in a range of
different settings with varying levels of informality.
Finally, some reformers have suggested that the public financing
of campaigns is likely to have the greatest impact in leveling the
political playing field and making citizens feel part of the political
process. Reforms of this nature would include a strengthened public
312. See MELLMAN-WlRTHLIN REPORT, supra note 175, at 32 q.18 (reporting that,
given two alternate statements and asked which statement best expresses their view of the
impact that fundraising commitments have on congressional members' ability to do their
job properly, 55% of Americans surveyed agreed with the statement "Members of
Congress spend so much time raising large political contributions that it interferes with
their ability to do their jobs properly," while only 19% agreed that "Members of Congress
have enough time to raise large political contributions without it interfering with their
ability to do their jobs properly" and 25% said they had no opinion).
313. See Donald J. Simon, Current Regulations and Future Challenges for Campaign
Financing in the United States, 3 ELECTION L.J. 474, 486-87 (2004) (proposing reform of
public financing and suggesting free airtime as a potentially beneficial campaign finance
reform); see also McCain, supra note 205, at 121 (advocating making free or subsidized
broadcast time available for candidates). Note, however, that safeguards may be
necessary to avoid the development of a symbiotic relationship between incumbent
politicians and broadcasters that could harm electoral challengers.
314. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 3 (2004)
(proposing a national deliberation holiday two weeks before an election where citizens
would gather in large and small groups to discuss national issues).
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financing system for presidential elections315 and the implementation
of a public financing system for congressional elections. 16 Even
under Buckley, voluntary public financing at the state level has
withstood court challenges;317 in a post-Buckley world, it is possible
that mandatory public financing could withstand judicial scrutiny.3 18
Undoubtedly, the embrace of equality as a guiding principle in
campaign finance laws risks the kind of unintended consequences that
have stymied reform efforts for the past quarter-century. Most
importantly, there is the risk that Congress would enact, and the
Court would uphold, laws that benefit some players in the political
system while leaving others at a disadvantage.319 Indeed, some
members of the Court are inherently suspicious of any campaign
finance law that Congress enacts because of the self-interested motive
that legislators inevitably have to protect their office.320 Similarly,
curtailing the ability of some groups to raise and spend money while
315. FECA includes a presidential public financing system, funded by taxpayer check-
off, for candidates who choose to opt into that system. I.R.C. § 9002-13 (2000). The
system has come under attack for being insufficiently funded and not attractive enough to
candidates, particularly candidates in primary elections. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 313,
at 482-83 (explaining structural shortcomings in the public financing system).
316. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 39, at 1189-95 (advocating for public financing
of congressional elections).
317. See, e.g., Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov'tal Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d
445 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding Maine initiative providing full public financing to qualified
candidates). For a pro-reform analysis of the constitutionality of so-called "Clean
Election" laws, see Memorandum from Brenda Wright, Managing Attorney, National
Voting Rights Institute, to Interested Persons (Apr. 2004), http://www.nvri.org/
about/constitutionality-ofcleanelections update.pdf. In 2000, Maine and Arizona both
instituted voluntary public funding for state legislative elections; preliminary results
indicated that the laws were successful at limiting the amount of private money spent
during the election cycle, helped equalize the positions of incumbents and challengers, and
created opportunities for new candidates. See Samantha Sanchez, First Returns on a
Campaign Finance Reform Experiment (Mar. 26, 2001), http://www.followthemoney
.org/press/ZZ/20010301.phtml.
318. Some data suggest that public financing may have adverse effects on efficacy,
however. See Primo & Milyo, supra note 163 (June 2005 manuscript at 28 tbl.3) (showing
a statistically significant, negative relationship between public funding of candidates
conditioned on expenditure limits and two measures of efficacy). Additionally, among the
reforms tested by Box-Steffensmeier et al., supra note 163, at 91 tbl.5.1, public funding of
congressional elections ranked as one of the least popular regulatory proposals tested-
just 38.6% of the adults surveyed agreed with this reform.
319. See, for example, the Court's differential treatment of corporations in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and its treatment of nonprofit
ideological corporations in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
320. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 249 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that regulation of campaign speech is intended to quell dissent against
those in power and gives incumbents an unfair advantage over challengers because of
increased name recognition and comparatively easy fundraising ability).
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leaving others unrestricted321 unfairly advantages the unregulated
groups.
Additionally, regulations would need to take account of the
power of incumbency,322 and provide either a higher expenditure limit
or state-conferred benefits for challengers that are not provided to
incumbents.3 23 Regulations would also need to ensure that all groups
interested in influencing the process have equally adequate
opportunities to have their message distributed; thus, expenditure
limits would need to be high enough that speech would not be
curtailed, but low enough that one set of interest or advocacy groups
could not dominate others.324 Such regulations would allow a fairer
"marketplace of ideas" that, while not "uninhibited," may be more
reflective of the diversity of views of all citizens and interest groups
regardless of financial resources.325
CONCLUSION
Considering the history of efforts to regulate campaign finance, it
is clear that there are many barriers-both structural and
constitutional-to wholesale reform. Congress is notorious for
piecemeal, incremental measures that are keenly attuned to its
321. Consider the 527 debate and the current difference in regulation between those
who engage in express advocacy and those who do not, for example. See also SMITH,
supra note 159, at 206 (arguing that regulation disadvantages average citizens in favor of
media elites and political operatives with skills that are valuable to candidates).
322. Incumbents have pre-existing name recognition, pre-existing bases of support,
easier means of generating free media coverage, and, often, money left over from previous
campaigns. See Marshall, supra note 300, at 369-70 (discussing the incumbent advantage
as a function of three factors: heightened name recognition and the corresponding ability
to campaign with less money; higher likelihood of receiving contributions, including
contributions from PACs; and greater accessibility to tools that aid in fundraising, such as
well-developed donor lists). See generally ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, EXPRESSIVE
POLITICS: ISSUE STRATEGIES OF CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGERS, 2-4 (2004)
(discussing disparities between incumbents and challengers in congressional contests);
Open Secrets, 2004 Election Overview: Incumbent Advantage, http://www.opensecrets
.org/overview/incumbs.asp?cycle=2004 (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (detailing fundraising
disparities between incumbents and challengers in Senate and House races in 2004).
323. See Pildes, supra note 112, at 152-53 (suggesting various competition-enhancing
reforms to help challengers); see also PETER LEVINE, THE NEW PROGRESSIVE ERA:
TOWARD A FAIR AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 132 (2000) (suggesting that qualified
candidates be given free postage for mailings to equalize the benefits that congressional
incumbents receive from the franking privilege).
324. Cf Dworkin, supra note 39, at 68 (advocating for moderately-set expenditure caps
for candidates and parties).
325. But see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 265 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The very 'purpose
of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail.' " (alteration in original) (quoting Red Lion Broad. v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))).
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reading of the mood of the Court326 and that give only minimal
guidance to implementing agencies. And, as three decades of
experience with campaign finance reform illustrates, intervention by
the Court into the legislative realm in the name of protecting the
Constitution often leaves in its wake a system of incoherent half-
measures.327  Buckley itself is a leading example of the Court's
willingness to dismantle a coherent regulatory scheme.328  One
significant issue then is the Court's willingness to defer to the "value
judgments made by legislative bodies on contested issues of political
equality."329 While the Court's early post-Buckley decisions displayed
skepticism towards allowing a self-interested legislature to make rules
governing elections,33 ° more recent decisions, including McConnell,
have taken a far more deferential approach.331
The criticism engendered by the vast outpouring of wealth
during the most recent election cycle demonstrates that, under the
current regulatory regime, "the money will find an outlet. 332 This, at
least, will be true as long as the Court interprets First Amendment
interests to allow caps on contributions, but not on expenditures,333
and treats candidates and political parties differently than
326. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, McCain, Feingold & Co. Laugh Last: Effort to Avoid
Legal Pitfalls Pays Off for Campaign Finance Crusaders, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2003, at
A28 (stating that BCRA's sponsors "knew the legal pitfalls and framed the bill carefully,
even rejecting attractive amendments that might prove troublesome in courts").
327. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 518 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting) (describing the Court's approach to analyzing FECA: "By striking
down one portion of an integrated and comprehensive statute, the Court has once again
transformed a coherent regulatory scheme into a nonsensical, loophole-ridden
patchwork.").
328. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 235 (1976) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("The Court's result does violence to the intent of Congress in this comprehensive scheme
of campaign finance. By dissecting the Act bit by bit, and casting off vital parts, the Court
fails to recognize that the whole of this Act is greater than the sum of its parts.").
329. Hasen, supra note 37, at 62-63.
330. Id. at 39-40 (discussing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978),
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), and Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985), in which the Court struck down
campaign finance laws that it saw as favoring entrenched political interests).
331. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 223-24 (2003) (explaining
the appropriateness of deference to Congress on BCRA); see also DANIEL HAYS
LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 947 (2d ed. 2001) (describing
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC as significant for the Court's adoption of a
more deferential approach to legislative judgments).
332. See S. 271 Hearing, supra note 23 (statement of Democratic lawyer Robert
Bauer). This warning, of course, echoes the McConnell Court's prediction that "money,
like water, will always find an outlet." McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224.
333. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
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independent groups.334 As an alternative to the continued flow of
cash into political campaigns, Congress and the Court should consider
the value of equality and democratic participation as important
features of campaign finance regulation. A comprehensive scheme
that allows reasonable limits on expenditures, limits on contributions
to candidates, parties, and independent political organizations, and a
range of incentives to encourage broader political engagement could
go a long way toward equalizing opportunities for democratic
participation by all citizens to "speak."
VICTORIA S. SHABO*
334. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
* The author wishes to thank Professor William P. Marshall of the University of
North Carolina School of Law and retired California State Judge Harold E. Shabo for
their insightful suggestions on earlier drafts of this Comment. All errors in fact or logic
are, of course, the author's own.
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